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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
<H, urr.\H,
Plai11l-iff a}l(/ Rf'SJJourleut,

Till~~ ~'1'.\TJ£

Case No.
9971

\'S.

.H~.\~ ~li\<

iL.\ IH,

Deff'udanf a11rl ApjJellant.

BRIEF

Q~F

APP·ELLANT

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Jean Sinclair appeals from a conviction for the crime
of first degree murder of Don LeRoy Foster in violation
of 76-30-3, UCA 1953.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The case was tried on a charge of first degree murder before a jury in the Third Judicial District Court
in and for Salt La:ke County, Utah, with Judge Marcellus
K. Snow presiding. After three weeks' trial the jury
returned a verdict of first degree murder with recommendation of leniency. Motion for new trial was filed
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

1

with supporting and counter affidavits being filed, wa~
argued to the Court and denied. The Appellant was sentenced to life imprisonment and appeals from the verdict
and judgment.
RELIEF SOUGHIT ON APPEAL
The appellant seeks relief in the alternative; (a) n·versal and discharge, (b) reversal and remand for a new
trial with directions to the trial court.
S'TATEMENT OF FACTS
Due to the extensive testimony and great length of
the record, the Statement of Facts is set forth in two
parts; first, that evidence relative to the killing of Don
LeRoy Foster including tiine, location, method and means
of killing, and the cause of death. There is little material
conflict as to these portions of the evidence and it is
clear that there was a killing by felonious n1eans in Salt
Lake County, Utah, on January 4th or 5th, 1963, \Yith
proper identification of the deceased.
Second portion of the staten1ent of facts relates to
the connection of the defendant, if any, with the crime
charged, and is necessarily set forth in some detail by
setting forth the material facts testified to hy eac·h
witness in the order which the presentation was made
in the District Court. This is done due to the vital questions before this Court concerning sufficiency of evidence and corroboration of the clain1ed accomplice.
Don LeRoy Foster \vas :killed about 12:30 a.m., Jan2

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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uary ;>, 1963 ut tlw ~m;an Kay ..:\.rm:; aparbnent parking

lot in Salt Lake City, l"tah. Cause of death w.a:; a gun
shot wound on tl1P right side of the face, neck and shoulder {lt 357 ). TIH· gun \\·as a shot gun, apparently a 12
~au~P. containing number 5 shot. The gauge of the gun
was dete11uined frmn wad:; recovered frmn the central
wound (H. :~ti-t-), which were identified by an FBI fire
arms expPrt (H. -199-500). The wound severed the carotid
artery, both jugular veins, and damaged the spinal cord
(H. 361). A combination of these injuries was the cause
of death. The shot left a center pattern 7 inches in diameter (H. 357). r:rhere were also shot punctures in the
dorstml of the right hand (R. 359). The shot would necessarily have been fired within 15 feet, probably less
(R. -H.i7). There is no wa~· of determ:ining fron1 what
weapon shot or wads were fired in an unrifled weapon
(R. 31:2).
Foster was a Inarried n1an estranged from his wife .
. :\ divorce adion was filed son1e 16 months previous to
his death and had lain donnant since that tilne (R. 1082).
Foster operated a service station at Second West and
Xorth Temple streets and had lived at the Susan Kay
Ann~ aparhnents since February, 1962. On the evening
of ~January -1, 1963, he had been to dinner at Alex Broiler
on Third South between :Main and \Vest Temple streets
in ~alt Lake City and to a 1novie at the Capitol Theatre
on Second South between niain and West Temple streets
with LaRae Peterson and her 8-year-old daughter, Cheryl
Ann. After leaving the theatre they took the child to a
baby ~itter below Thirty-third South on West Temple.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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They proceeded frmn here to the Prescription Pharmacy
on :Main Street where Foster purchased some bufferin,
then north on ~:fain street to Center street, along Center
street to Fifth North where they turned into the parking
lot of the Susan Kay Arms apartment. Foster pulled
the automobile into a parking spot in front of the garage,
the parking spot not being that assigned to his apartlnent, and being immediately north of the six-foot chain
link fence. The deceased got out of the car, reached over
the back seat to pick up his overcoat and straightened
up when ~lrs. Peterson heard an explosion, saw a flash
through the left rear window and saw ~-,oster slide down
the fence to the black-top between the fence and the auto-mobile. She got out of the car and ran around the front
of the car screan1ing, "my God, he shot himself." She
did not see anyone in the immediate vicinity and did
not hear anyone running away. She knelt down, put
Foster's head in her lap and tried to stop the flow of
blood. She looked for a gun but she said she did not
find one. However, witness Gerretadina Combee and
her husband Pieter Combee, who arrived at the scene of
the shooting with a flashlight on the other side of the
fence shortly after they heard the shot, testified that
they saw l\Irs. Peterson hand a small pistol to an unidentified man standing in the shadows towards the front
of the car from where :Mrs. Peterson was kneeling.
Witness John Storey arrived where Foster was 15
seconds after he heard a shot followed by screams. He
cante around the corner of an apartment to the north
and could see clear to the street but saw no one leaving
the area nor did he see any person until he saw Mrs.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Peter::ion kneeling and holding the deceased's head. 1mmediately thereafter many p(_}ople gathered fro1n surrounding apartments.
rrhe police were called and arrived at 12 :40 a.n1.,
eondncted an investigation and took pictures.
La.lVlar B. \Villiams, an off-duty police officer, was
at the north end of the Susan Kay apartlnents on the
enrly morning of January 5th visiting his ex-wife (R.
~)77). He was leaving about 12:25 a.m. and had trouble
::-tarting his ear. He saw a person coming out of the
archway and as he backed out he observed the facial
features in his rear view mirror (R. 979). Hair on the
darker side, quite wavy in front going straight back, a
long nose, receding chin line with a cleft chin. The per~on resembled Jean Sinclair. The person was dressed in
dark trousers and light short coat coming somewhere
between the ~{nees and the crotch. He can't identify the
type of coat. When faced by :Miss Sinclair he achnitted
that her ehin wasn't cleft or in an S curve. Her hair was
not dark. The person he saw weighed between 165 and
180 lbs. and appeared to be a man (R. 983).
Boyd K. Harvey was driving home in the late hours
of January 4th or early 1norning of January 5th, 1963.
He wa:-; driving along Fifth X orth street between Second
and First \Vest. He heard a shot, a scream and saw a
person running from the Susan Kay apartments driveway (R. 985). This person was wearing a three-quarter
length car coat ending above the knees. He didn't see
the head clearly. The person was running from the fence
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across the lawn carrying an object high in his right hand
away from the body. The object was 18 to 24 inches long
(R. 987). ·The person appeared to be very agile and was
running fast. ·The man ran across the parking lot on
Fifth North and got into the passenger side of a vehicle
which drove away before the witness could make a U
turn and get close enough to get the license plate number.
lie described the person 5 ft. 6 in. to 5 ft. 10 in., burly
and heavy set. He told the police the running person
was a man. He didn't consider .a woman until he read
about Miss Sinclair in the newspapers (R. 988). The
automobile which the person entered was a two-tone
Chevrolet sedan, 1954 or 1955. ~rhe person's trousers
were darker than the coat. ·The person was "very agile,
running without deformities. I thought it was a man."
(R. 990).
·The State's case is centered on the testimony of Carl
Kuehne, who, after being picked up on two different
occasions by the police at the instance of V.aughn Humphreys, and held overnight on the second occasion, made
a statement that would tend to implicate the defendant
in the crime. Carl Kuehne testified he has been convicted of a felony, assault with .a deadly weapon, about
1952, and confined in the Utah State Prison. While there
he escaped from a fire fighting detail in 1958. He is
a mathematics major .at the University of Utah with a B
ave.rage. He met Miss Sinclair through Vaughn Humphreys in October of 1960 and went deer hunting with
:Miss Sinclair, Humphreys and other persons. That he
didn't see the defendant thereafter until August, 1962.
(Fnur (4) other witnesses, including State's witness
6
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llwuphn·y:.;, indica tt•d that he ~a w her vanous ti1nes
uul'ing 1.961 (H. ;)~:;). 1\..uehne test II i~._·d that on the first
meeting in 19ti:2 he told her he had a post office clearance
(H. j:27), wht-reupon he began a di:-;eu:-;sion with her regarding what should be done with a person who wa~ cau~
ing a woman to 1nistreat her child (H.. ;)2~-29) and she
uft't>rPd hun $500.00 to kill the person but did not identify
him (It ;>:29). Don Foster was not 1nentioned during the
fir~t conversation. K.uehne first saw Foster late in October, 1962 (R. ;)32). (This is contradicted by LaRae
L'etenwn's testinwny that a person na1ned Stewart (the
name used by 1\:euhne) caine to the Susan l(ay apartment~ to talk to Foster on the 23rd of September, 1962.)
Kuelme ::;aid he did not see the defendant frmn Septenlber to Ootober just before deer season, but on cross
examination admitted receiving a check from her on
Odober 7, 1962 (R. 611). He went to three (3) places
with the defendant to detennine the best place to kill
Fo~ter (R. 50-1), to-wit: .Mrs. Turner's (Foster's
mother's home). Kuehne testified it was 3 to 4 1niles
we~t of the nursing home (R. 540).
(Mrs. Turner
tP~tified her hmne is 1:Y2
blocks west of the
nursing home.) LaRae Peterson's home in Kearns which
he described as red brick (R. 539), (LaRae Peterson
testified her hon1e in Kearns is light grey cinder block
(R. 813).), and the Susan Kay apartments where Foster
and LaRae Peterson were living.

He went to Foster's apartment at defendant's reque:_.;t to beat him up.
He testified that he gave Foster the nmne of Stewart
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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(R. 549) and told Foster to leave LaHae Peterson alonP

so he could marry her. He said he had never seen Foster
until late October (R. 531, 619-20). (LaRae Petpr~on
placed the date that l{uehne came to the apartment
under the name of Stewart as September 23, 19G:2 (R.
839-40.) Kuehne further stated that the defendant
brought him to the Susan Kay apartment when he went
to talk to Foster and waited across the road. He had
only seen Foster once. (Four (4) witnesses, including
State's witness LaRae Peterson, testified the defendant
was in California or on her way to California on Sep~
tember 23, 1962.) On December 28, 1962 at defendant's
request he bought a used 12-gauge shot gun and a box
of No. 5 shells at Lee's Loans on Second South between
State and Main (R. 571). He gave a false name, George
Stewart, and a false address, Elko, Nevada. vVhen asked
why, he stated "Just a little bit of caution on my part
since the king had been threatening to kill Don Foster."
Kuehne testified to many conversations with the defendant with regard to killing Foster but cannot place
any dates (R. 601-2), with the exception of December 28,
1962 when he bought the shot gun and January 4, 1963
when he testified that the defendant came to his home
three (3) times, the first about 6:00p.m. o'cloc:k when she
left the shot gun to be sawed off. He said Jean arrived
the second time about 8 :30 p.m., received some leather
goods he had made for her, wrote out a check, Exhibit
No. 33, in his presence. (The check is dated January
3, 1963.) He showed her how to load the gun and how
to put it on safety. She wrapped the gun in "what he
found out later was a white coat" and said she was
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization
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going to ukill Iny~elf a ~on-of-a-biteh" and left after
11:00 p.m. (H. :)78-79). She wa~ dre~~ed in fleece-lined
hoot;-;, gr·t·y flannl•l panb, whitP ~hirt and a hlue parka
(R. 580).

When she left he went to bed, woke up and Jean
standing by the stove warming her hands. 'rhe shot
gun was in the corner. She was dressed as before, but
wearing the white trench coat. There was dirt and
grease on the coat and right leg of the pants (R. 584.
rrhe coat hung below her knees (R. 585). She told hiiu
she had ..:killed the son-of-a-bitch. LaRae was present
but just screamed." Jean said she couldn't get up to the
chain link fence and had to crawl under a car. She
told the witness he was an accon1plice before and after
the fact and had to get rid of the gun (R. 586). She
made a phone call and left. l-Ie walked out to the car
with her, returned, took the gun apart., put it in a sack
with the shells fr01n which he had emptied the shot
beween Jean's first and second visits (R. 656), he took
the sack out behind the garage (R. 586-89). When he
returned to the house he looked at the clock and it was
1.00 a.m. (R. 631). His wife returned about 3.00 a.m.
and after eating and helping one of her friends move,
hi~ wife drove hiin up Emigration Canyon where he
disposed of the gun parts and shells by throwing then1
from the road towards the creek at various intervals.
wa~

(R. 589-91). He returned home and shaved off his beard

of

j

months (R. 5~):2). He showed the police where 'he

had thro\vn the gun parts and shells, and after they
had been unsuccessful in attempts to find them on the
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25th or 26th of February during a recess in the preliminary hearing, following a policeman telling him the,·
were getting a detachment of National Guardsmen to
search the area, Kuehne took Vaughn Humphrey8 up
the Canyon. They were unaccompanied hy polie<' or
other persons. They found the gun stock, Exhibit No. 21,
in the creek bed and brought it to the police station
(R. 604, 639-40). On cross examination he admitted he
could not place any conversation with Jean as to time
and place (R. 608). He can't place the meeting with
Don Foster, even to the month (R. 621). His testimony
varied many times from his testimony in the preliminary
hearing (R. 631, 645, 646, 648, 650, 654, 663, 667, 668,
669, 670, 671, 676). The police 1nade him no threats or
promises, but they did hold him over night and they
discussed with him the possibility of getting a pardon
for his previous felony. He saw no person other than
the defendant between 6.00 p.n1., January 4th and 3 :00
to 3:30 a.n1., January 5th, 1963. On each occasion when
a question was asked concerning the shot gun and the
shells, Kuehne tried to claim privilege under the Fifth
Amendment.*
The District Attorney elicited testimony as to a
previous felony record of Kuehne and an escape from
a pri8on work detail together with a voluntary return
(R. 521-22. The Court refused to let defense counsel
pursue this question on cross examination (R. 694).
7.'(Each time, the court compelled him to answer (R. 56976-87-88). Apparently on the basis that he had waived his
privilege by testifying at the preliminary hearing CR. 570).)
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l'ounMel madt- a Prof'ft·r of Proof (It 117 to 1:>1. 7:>s.
7:1~1). Tht- ( 'ourt refused to allow counsel to pur~uP
Kuehnt•':-; p:-;yt·h ia t rie background (R. G9G). Again a
Proffer ot' Proof wa:-; Inade (H. 711-138, 739).
Vaughn Hu1nphreys testified that he had known the
defendant for 1;>-yPars through her partner's son Bill
Rawlins ( 1\. 719). He had known LaRae Peterson for
7 or S years but had never been out with her (R. 720).
He had known Carl Kuehne since the early spring of
1960 ... was a friend of K.uehne and had introduced
Kuehne to Jean Sinclair in the fall of 1960 when they
wPnt deer hunting with a group of people. In the summer
and fall of 1962 he had several discussions with Jean
regarding Don Fosters going with LaRae Peterson. Jean
wa~ worried about LaRae's daughter Cheryl Ann aNd
wanted the Foster-Peterson relationship terminated. (R.
i~5-~(}). He contacted officers on bYo (2) different
oc.casions trying to get them to do something about
breaking up the relationship (R. 727, 730, 731). Jean
talked with \T aughn about adopting Cheryl Ann. He
s.aid she talked to him about it being a good idea to
disguise as Danites, catch Foster and threaten to castrate him (R. 733-34). Humphreys was at the Susan
Kay Arms on New Years Eve, 1962 (R. 735). He had
disru~sed getting dates with LaRae Peterson with Jean
but she told him LaRae "·as too expensive for him (R.
736). In Xoven1ber he learned from Carl Kuehne of a
plot to kill Foster and to leave his (Vaughn's) hunting
jacket at the scene of the killing. Thereafter he didn't
go around the rest home again until he went to see
Bill Rawlins at Christmas (R. 7-12). He never discussed
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the matter of the jacket with Jean and didn't bother
to pick up his jacket (R. 142). He didn't mention Jean
to either of the officers he contacted about breaking up
the Foster-Peterson relationship. He had made the comment about Foster- "that son-of-a-bitch is getting some
of that and I'm not" (R. 747). LaRae Peterson had gone
with several men to Vaughn's knowledge ·w:hile she had
the beauty shop at the rest home (R. 749). He told
Kuehne that Jean was a lesbian while on the original
deer hunt in October, 1962 (R. 749), based on her interest
in LaRae Peterson and her interest in Cheryl Ann'8
welfare (R. 751-52).
He had an argument with Jean in a cafe in Provo,
Utah in the latter part of November and stopped going
to her place (R. 755-56). He talked with her once on
the phone in December, 1962 when she accused him of
spreading rumors that she was a lesbian. He denied
to her that he had said anything of such nature (R. 756).
Ellen Rawlins was equally concerned about the child
Cheryl Ann's welfare as was the defendant (R. 757).
Vaughn and Bill Rawlins had called Jean "the King"
for 13 or 14 years because she "ruled the roost" (R. 758).
No one else called her King (R. 758). He overheard
a conversation between Jean and Thayle Olsen regarding
Jean's affection for LaRae and concern for Cheryl Ann
(R. 762). He didn't recall what was said in the conversation (R. 763).
LaRae Peterson testified she is divorced and the
mother of a 9-year-old child (R. 767). She ran a beauty
shop in the defendant's rest home from October 1956
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to October, 1Uti:2. ~lw took care of the patients' hair in
return for rent and utilities and also had her own
t•ustomers. ,Jean and her partner Ellen cared for the
child while LaRae was working (R. 769). LaRae left
the rest home on October 6, 1962 to be closer to Don
Foster's work and to take special training from Kay
Butters (R. 769). She knew \'aughn IIumphreys for
7 or S years ... she had never seen C.arl Kuehne until
the preliminary hearing (R. 770). Both Ellen and Jean
had given her money and groceries (R. 773). She knew
Foster's divorce was not final and h.ad not gone to
eourt (R. 775). She had gone on trips with Jean and
had visited Jean at a motel (R. 776). She had never
seen Jean follow her (R. 779). She h.ad been followed
but never looked for any one car in particular (R. 779).
\Vhen asked by the District Attorney if she had committed any lesbian acts with Jean Sinclair she stated
on voir dire that she didn't know what lesbian acts were
and didn't know if homosexual acts between women were
possible.•
She kept clothes at Foster's aparbnent at the Susan
Kay apartments and parked her car in Foster's assigned
parking stall. She identfied a note, Exhibit No. 30, as
being in Jean's handwriting and said she found it at the
~lwp some time between Christmas, 1961 and April 28,
*The District Attorney asked if she had had any homosexual
acts with Jean Sinclair. Defense counsel objected on the grounds
of ambiguity and immateriality, but objection was overruled
and the witness claimed privilege under 78-24-9, U.C.A. The
Court directed her to answer. She refused, and the Court informed her she would be held in contempt. She still refused
1 R. 787-88).
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

13

1962 after she started going with Don Foster (R. 794).*""
She talked with Jean about 5:00p.m. on Jaunary 4,
1963 by telephone and told her that she, Don and Cheryl
Ann were going to a show. She doesn't think she told
Jean what show or what ti1ne ( R. 797). She called
again about 7:30 p.m. at the rest home but Jean waH
not in (R. 797). LaRae and her daughter went to the
Susan Kay apartments, left her car in the north parking
lot and went to Don's apartment (R. 799). The three
(3) went to Alex Broiler, had dinner, and went to the
show at the Capitol ·Theatre. They left the show and
took Cheryl Ann to Morgan Pace's on West Temple.
LaRae and Don proceeded to the Prescription Pharmacy,
then north on Main to Center street, along Centc•r street
to Fifth north and into the Susan Kay parking lot from
the Fifth north entrance (R. 801). Foster pulled into
the parking space by the garage, opened the car door,
picked up his overcoat from the back seat and started
to close the door. LaRae heard a loud noise, saw a
flash through the left rear window, and Foster slipped
down the fence (R. 803). She got out, and around the
front of the car and !knelt down and put his head in her
lap (R. 804). She didn't see anyone at the time of the
shooting and didn't see anyone leaving the area (R. 821).
The parking space where the shooting occurred was not
Foster's regular parking place. The apartment manager'::;
-):--:'In an affidavit filed on Motion for a new trial (R. 119-20), she
recanted this testimony recollecting that the note had been
received by her some two (2) years earlier.
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:-;on also u~eu it (H. SJ ~). Fo~ter had a new ear. LaRae
had nl'Vl'l' tolu Jean about the new car (H. 813). LaHae':-;
home in Kearns i:-; grey cinder block . . . it had never
bePn n·d (H. Sl~). ~l.rs. Turner (Don Foster':-; .Jlother),
lin·~ on Sunset avenue between .Jlain and \Vest Temple
str.-ds (R. Sl-!). Foster normally carried a gun in the
car (R. S~~). LaRae thought at first he had shot himself.
~he has never ~een Jean run (R. 823). She had never
~een Jean act out physically or harm any person or
animal. Jean frequently wore western type clothes.
La It at> had gone with several other men while working
at the rest home and had planned to marry .Jlr. Craven.
The contemplated marriage created no problem with
Jean (R.831). LaRae, Cheryl Ann and Foster went to
the \Vorlds Fair in Septe1nber, 1962 (R. 833).

LaRae licensed the beauty shop at the rest home
for 1963 after ~he had moved out on October 6, 1962
~H. 833). ~he returned thereafter to do the patients'
hair (R. s:~-1- ). She talked with Jean about leaving after
Jean returned from California early in October, 1962.
There was never any trouble between Foster and Jean
Sinelair (R. 837). Foster's divorce, to her knowledge,
had been filed for a year and 3 Inonths but had not
g-o1w to court at the time of his death .
..:\ person identifying hilnself as George Stewart
crune to Foster's apartn1ent while LaRae was there on
the evening of Sunday, September 23rd or :Monday,
September ~-!th, 1962 and talked to Foster about leaving
LaRae alone. LaRae placed the tin1e as during a beauty
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convention she \Yas attending at the Terrace Ballroom
(R. 839). Jean was in California delivering a hor~l'
at this time (R. 840). LaRae never had an argument
or harsh words with Jean regarding Foster (R. 841).
She saw Jean drive past Foster's Inother's home on
Mothers Day, 1962 (R. 842). ~he took down the license
number of a car which was following her after the :killing. The car was a 1954 or 1955 2-tone Chevrolet.*
Jean owned a brown deer skin jacket (R. 844).
Loren Hallen testified he is a bank officer at the
First Security Bank where Jean Sinclair has an account.
He identified two (2) checks on the Sinclair account
dated in January, 1963 with the earlier date being on tlw
higher numbered check (R. 855).
Ned Greenig, Court Reporter, testified to a conversation in the Courts chambers in which the defendant
stated she had never been to the Susan Kay Apartments
(R. 858). The statement was not made under oath but
was part of a conversation between counsel (R. ~5H) .)
David Wetzel testified he met Sinclair at Carl
Kuehne's apartment on December 28, 1962. The three
of them talked about a half hour. She had a bottle
of Irish whiskey with her. She was dressed in jeans
and a shirt. The witness left about 10:30 p.m. (R. 863).
LaRae Kuehne testified she is thf' wife of Car1
*The license was identified as registered to Mel Humphreys,
Vaughn Humphreys' father.

16
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Kuehne and a waitress at the Tiki Hut on Second South. •
8he knows Jean Sinclair. Jean wanted her to call Don
Foster to get hi1n up to the rest hmne to watch J·ean
tutu LaRae Peterson in "the lesbian act" (R. 869). She
went to work on January -!that 6:00p.m. She came home
at 3 :00 a.m. January 5, 1963. Her husband was in bed.
They went to breakfast, returned home, got the pieces of
a shot gun, drove up Emigration Canyon where her
hu~band threw them away. When they returned home
Carl Kuelme shaved off his beard (R. 872).
Kenneth Forsberg owns Lee's Loans, a pawn shop
on Second South between State and .Main in Salt Lake
City, Utah (R. 888). On December 28, 1962 he sold a
~~-gauge shot gun and a box of No. 5 12-gauge shells
to a person who identified himself as George Stewart of
Elko, Xevada (R. 889). George Stewart appeared to be
the same person as a newspaper picture of Carl Kuehne,
8ans beard (R. 890).
Yal Jean Pace works at Grand Central Market. She
knows Jean Sinclair, LaRae Peterson and Don Foster
(R. 896). She had a conversation with Jean in December,
1962 in which Jean hoped LaRae would cmne back and
work at the beauty shop. If she did, Jean would help
her get a car (R. 8!17).
Gerritadina Cmubee lives with her husband at :250
\\"est 5th Xorth inunediately south of the spot where

;<The Tiki Hut is immediately west of the Capitol Theatre where
Foster went to the movies on the night of the killing.
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Don Foster was shot (R. 899). Sometime around C!tristInas, 1962 she sa,,- a woman in a fringed leather jadi:t•t
and trousers walking south fron1 the Susan Kay parking
lot. She identified that person as the defendant (R. 903).
On cross examination she admitted she ~aw the person
from the right rear and only for "a step or 4 or ;>''
(R. 9'18). She never saw the face (R. 921), and couldn't
describe the hair color or clothing other than the fringhl
jacket She later in the trial identified Jean ~ineln ir's
jacket as the type and color she had seen.
Ellen McHenry testified she had been Jean Sinclair's partner at the rest home business since 1946.
She remarried on October 11. 1962 (R. 92~). She is still
at the rest home daily (R. 923). She raised her three
(3) children at the rest home "-ith ~Tean's help Her
invalid husband also lived there until his death in 1949.
I-Ier son Bill's 12-gauge shot gun is at the rest home
and has been there for years (R. 933). Jean owns a
brown leather 1ac.ket but has never owned a trench coat.
Jean does have a full length ivory-colored leather coat
(R. 925-26). ~i[ost of the Silver Spurs (a women's riding
club to which both Jean and the witness belong) have
fringed leather jackets silnilar to Jean's ( R. 928).
Kenyon Donaldson in company with John Harwood,
both City Water Department surveyors, found a shot
gun barrel in Emigration Canyon on March 25, 1963
about 50' from the road in a sn1all clearing.
John Harwood's testin1ony is substantially the same
as Donaldson's.
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Joe Long~on, police ddedin:•, identfied ~hot gun
found by himself and others in his presence in
~~migration Canyon, Exhibit No. 16.

~hells

Glen Cahoon, Det. Sgt. Salt Lake City Police Departtm•nt, identified a eardboard shot gun shell box
found by him in Emigration Canyon, Exhibit No. 17 (R.
~~:">:!-;>:~). Although there had been hip-deep snow between
January 4th and the finding of the box, the box didn't
appear to have been wet or water damaged (R. 957).
There had been several careful searches by officers in
the area indicated to them by Kuehne, including the use
of mine detectors, with no part of the gun being fotmd,
but certain shells were found (R. 959-60).
The area in which Kuehne and Humphreys claimed
they found the gun stock, Exhibit No. 21, is not one of
the area~ where Kuehne told the officers to search (R.
963). Cahoon had told Kuehne two (2) days before
Kuehne and flumphreys found the gun stock that the
police were going to take at least 100 National Guardsmen and comb the area (R. 973).
LaMar Bowen vVillian1s' testi1nony is set forth in
the first portion of the Statement of Fact as is that of
Royd I\:. Harvey.
Joyce Harris testified she works for a cleaners
in .Murray. On the 1norning of January 5th Jean Sinclair brought in some cleaning including several pairs
of trousers, several sweaters, and a coat and a jacket.
The coat was a tan trench coat. She checked the pockets
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and put the clothes in a bin. Jean frequently brought
in clothes to be cleaned, both her and the patients. Tlw
witness didn't notice anything unusual about the coat.
Jean didn't return for the clothes for several dayH
(R. 999).

Orvis Allred works as a cleaner in .Murray. On
the afternoon of January 5th he examined a coat with
8alt Lake City police officer Paul ( R. 1001). The
coat was a tan overcoat, full length as differentiated
from three-quarters. The officer had him check spots
on the coat to see if they were blood. It was not blood.
The spots were not excessive. They seemed to be an oil
type stain. One pair of trousers were stained (R·. 1004).
The largest spots on the coat were about the size of a
quarter. There were no spots on the arms or sides (R.
1005). Jean picked up the clothes several days later.
They were not impounded (R. 1006).
Alex Paul is an officer of the Salt Lake City police
department. He was sent to the Murray cleaners to
examine some clothes on January 5th, 1963. He saw
a tan trench coat three-quarter length with buttons on
the right s~ide. It came to the knee area or below-had
marks underneath the arm, on the arms and on the
bottom near the seam. Also on the back area (R. 1008).
Some spots were the size of a dinner plate or larger.
A grey pair of pants with dirt in the knee area and
around the cuff were also exmnined (R. 1009). The
dirt was kind of gray with darker spots. The coat
was cotton gabardine. The clothes were not impounded
(R. 1003).
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The State reHted.
Defendant n1ade a motion to dismiss (H. 1005) Pt

Defendant's Case:

Phillip Procter testified he works for the motor
vehicle divi~ion in the State Tax Com1nission. He identified Exhibit -Hi, a registration showing Mel Hmnphrey~
at ~1 <i-t- South -1-th East, Salt Lake City to be the regh;tered owner of a 1954 Chevrolet 4-door sedan \vith
license number Utah 1963 - D9207. \Vas issued on
February ~:2, 1963 (R. 1034).
John Pulsipher is frmn Las Vegas, Nevada and
knows Carl Kuehne. He had three (3) conversations
with Kuehne in which Kuehne stated he was a Nazi
prisoner of war for 2 years. vVhen he ca1ne home his
wife had a 9-month old baby daughter. Kuehne said he
killed them both adding "if they can't find the bodies
they can't convict nobody of any crime" (R. 1008). On
cross examination he testified that Kuehne bro:ke up
hi~ first marriage. He doesn't know Jean Sinclair never saw her before he walked into the court room.
Carl R. Andreasen is a Naturopathic physician and
surgeon, in private practice for 22 years, 10 years being
in Utah. He is licensed to practice medicine in Utah.
He has known Jean Sinclair since 1954. Jean has con:'ulted him about a reducing program for the last 3 years
tR. 101:2). She has lost weight continually for those
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three years but nwre rapidly in the sununer of 1962
when she was having dental problems (R. 1013). She
has residuals from a spinal fusion giving her numbne~~
in the lower extre1nities and difficulty in walking. Dr.
Andreasen has treated her for injuries from falls. He
has never seen ~Iiss Sinclair run. It is his opinion
that she cannot run (R. 1060). The opinion is based on
her spinal injury, loss of sensation in the legs and
bladder, and being unable to feel what is undPr the soles
of her feet. Her reputation in the community for being
peaceful and law abiding is good (R. 1018). On cross
examination he stated she might play golf but couldn't
hit the ball very far. She could not 1nove as fast as the
normal person could walk (R. 1016). The lad~ of balance is partially compensated by eye sight.
Counsel for the parties stipulated that the divorce
action - Don Leroy Foster vs. Beth W orthin Foster wa:filed in the Third District Court in October, 1961.
Answer and counter claim was filed November 13, 1961.
No further pleading had been filed at Foster's death
on January 5, 1963 (R. 1082).
Ellen McHenry testified she had been in the nursing
home business with Jean Sinclair since 1946. Both partners lived at the nursing home until October, 1962 when
Ellen married Bill McHenry. Her three children were
raised at the nursing home and her former husband
lived there until his death (R. 101-:1:). Ellen is still at
the nursing home evenT day. She has never se,en Jean
run or get on a horse without assistance. She has known
LaRae Peterson for 8 years. LaRae started a beauty
22
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:-;hop at the uur~1 ng home .at Ellen':-; n•q ue~t in 1930.
Lal:at· did not lin· there and n(•\'Pr ~lept there. LaRae·~
daughter ('hpryl .\nn ~tayed over night h\·ice (R. 1081).
Tht> shop and Pquipment were furnished by the nursing
home und LaHae furnished supplies for doing the patit·nt~' hair (I\. 1088). I~llen and Jean too:k care of ihe
t•hild. ThPy had had di~eussions about the child and
the adver~P pffect the Foster-Peterson relationship was
huvi.ng on thP <·hild (R. 1090). Ellen and Thayle Olson
hired a detectivt> to follow LaRae (R. 1091). They
di<ln't tell J e.an about the detective. Ellen paid the bill.
~he has known Huu1phreys since 1946 or 1947 as a
friend of lwr son Bill (R. 1093). Only Bill and Yauglm
PVPI' called Jean the l(ing (R. 1093). Kuehne \ras at
tht> nur~ing home tiJany tinws in 1961 (R. 1904). Part
of tlw time while Jean was there (R. 1095). Kuehne
nPn•r referred to Jean as ''l(ing" until after Foster's
shooting (R. 1095). Yaughn I-Iumphreys was at the
nursing home at frequent inversals. The witness heard
Humphreys ask LaRae for dates both before and after
lw went in the army. Htunphreys always inquired about
LaHae wlwn he cmne (R. 1096). Humphreys brought
up the ~nbject of adoption of Cheryl Ann - not Jean,
and it wa~ in Elllen ·~ presence. Ellen and Jean had never
di:·wn~~ed adoption other than that occasion (R. 1099).
It wa~ Humphreys' idea to contact the police to break
up Foster and Peterson (R. 1101-1102) .
.Jean signed bank checks in blank and Jean, Ellen
her ch'tnghter Joane would fill them in (R.1102-1106) ).
St'mrtimes a lower nun1bered' check would be filled in
several days after a higher nun1bered check (R. 1107).
t)r
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On January 4th Ellen saw Jean in the afternoon at the
nursing home. Ellen ·went bowling at l(oler Lanes in
Sandy and had a phone conversation with Jean about
9:30 p.m. regarding an injury to Bill Rawlins (R. 1111).
She was present at a conversation regarding the boo1(
"The Twenty-Seventh \Yife" when Jean and Vaughn
discussed Danites, disguises, castration or harm to Don
Foster were not mentioned (R. 1111).
Jean went to California to deliver a horse on either
the 22nd or 23rd of September 1962 (R. 1150). LaRae
moved out of the beauty shop on October 6th or 7th,
1962 (R. 1117). Jean was even tempered and never
used violence even with the children (R. 1119). Hel'
reputation in the community for being peaceful and law
abiding is good (R. 1119). Justice of the Peace Mel
Hu1nphreys is Yaughn Humphreys' father (R. 1120).
On cross examination she explained the plan of the
living quarters of the rest home (R. 11:21 et seq) and the
practice of the business as to writing checks (R. 1182
et seq). She and Jean discussed personal problems including LaRae and Cheryl Ann. Both she and Jean
were concerned over Cheryl Ann and the effect tlH'
Foster-Peterson relationship was having on her (R.
1143). Ellen didn't discuss hiring a detective with Jean
(R. 1144). She had tu~d Jean she didn't think Foster
would marry La Rae (R. 1150). Jean wore slacks around
the nursing home with boots and oxfords with a 2"
heel. She always wore her hair short. Jean used lipstick
and liquid 1nakeup when she went out (R. 1165). Jean
does chores aro,und the farm. Ellen saw Jean bowl
once in 1947 (R. 1167) Jean can't put a horse in a trailer
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alonl• and had never owned a man·~ ~mit (H. 11o9). Jean
had a full length leather coat but never had a white,
beige or tan trench coat (R. 1181). Vaughn Hu1nphreys
had a beige trench coat ( lL 1181). So did Ellen'~ sons
while tlwy were living there (R. 1182). Jean has a blue
ski jacket (R. 1181).
Mildred Sinclair testified she is Jean's sister-in-law
and has lived at the nursing hmne since coming fron1
California December 2, 1962 (R. 1185). On Januar~· ±,
I !Hi:~ Jean was hon1e at 4 :30 p.1n. when .Jlildred and
her husband arrived from Sandy. She left at 6 :30 or
7:00 o'clock and returned about 7:45 and left again.
Jean returned home the second time about 8 :30 and
stayed the balance of the night. They ate pizza and
watched r_ry, Jean worked on the books (R. 1189).
~lildred went to bed about 2 :30 a.n1., January 5th after
helping fix the pills for the patients and feed the dogs
(H. 1190). Jean was still up when ~Lildred went to bed.
Slw was never out of ~Eldred's sight for .a period of
more than 10 Ininutes between 8 :30 p.n1. January 4th
and ~:30 a.m. on January 5th (R. 1191). She woke Jean
up on the couch in the living room at 8 :30 a.m. January
5th (R. 1163). Jean was at ~Eldred's home in California
the latter part of Septe1nber with a truck and horse
trailer (R. 1197). ~lildred can't ren1en1ber the T\'" shows
January 4th except ~I itch l\liller and Jack Paar (R.
1104-). She saw nurse Reva Nelson at 8:30p.m. while she
was fixing J e.an's pizza and X urse Eatchell about 1 :00
and 1 :30 a.m. Xurse X elson left at 10 :00 p.m. Mildred's
husband Lamond woke her up at one time during the
night (R. 1210) while investigating smne Inusie playing
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(R. 1212). On the morning of January 5th she heard
the help talking about Foster's death and LaRae Peterson. She woke Jean to find out if it was the smne LaRae
Peterson who had run the beauty shop (R. 1214).
Gerretadina Combee was called for the defense. She
had testified earlier. She and her husband came home on
January 4th about 12 :00 midnight. She saw a car in
front of her home with a person on the driver's side.
She didn't know whether it was a man or woman. While
she was getting ready for bed she heard a shot (R. 1228).
She saw someone run around the car screaming "she
killed me- she killed him- help." She and Mr. Combee ran to the fence. Her husband had a flashlight.
La Rae Peterson stated "I was thinking he shot hisself.
Look what he had in his hand." l\1rs. Combee saw a
small black pistol. LaRae gave it to a man standing near
the front of the car. Foster was lying on the ground
shot. Mrs. Combee told the police about the gun (R.
1231). Pieter Combee echoed his wife's testimon~·.
Lamond Sinclair testified he is the brother of the
defendant and has been living at the rest home since
December 2, 1962 (R. 1249). He never heard Carl
Kuehne call Jean "King" (R. 1251). On January 4th
he saw Jean around 5 :00 p.m. in the living room of
the rest home (R. 1251). Jean left twice in the Buick
sedan. The station wagon was disabled (R. 1252). She
left about 7 :00 p.m. and was gone about an hour and
then left again about 8 :00 for 20 minutes to one-half hour
she was back before 9:00 o'clock. Lamond, his wife and
Jean ate pizza and watched TV. Jean did other things
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(H. 1~;>-t.).

~~~P wa~ ~till

there when he Wl'nt to bed
at'tt>r TV signed off (H. 1:2;>S). Jean wa~ in Chula
\'ista, California in late September (H. 1:2()0). On the
night of January -lth ~he was wearing light slacks and
a jacket. She had one telephone call that evening (R.
l~(i:~). He remembered the ~liteh _Miller show and the
Jack Parr ~how. Ill· retired just after TY signed of£
(lt l~(i-!). He :-;Ll\\' rl,hehna Eatchell when he got up to
investigate a noise in the early nwrning hours. Thelma
was sitting at the dining roo1n table. lie ·went in the
living room. Jean was asleep in a chair (R. 1266).
Thayle Olsen tt>~tified she had known Jean since
1951, SPP~ her occasionally. She had known Vaughn
Hwnphrey~ since 1952 or 1953. Knows Ellen Rawlins
and LaRae Peterson (R. 1276). In the smnmer of 1962
~he hired a dPteetive to follow Peterson and Don Foster.
~lw did thi~ in coniunction with Ellen Rawlins (R. 1278).
~he had not told Jean about the detective prior to January ;), 1963. She didn't have a conversation with Jean
in Yaughn Hun1phreys presence involving LaRae Pett>rson (R. 1~SO). Slw did go to dinner with Jean a'nd
Humphreys in the fall of 1962 after a football game.
r aughn drank all her Scotch ( R. 1292). She has never
:known .Jean to wear a 1nan's suit or a homberg hat (R.
1~~~)). ~he called Foster's wife and Foster's wife called
her back (R. 1289). Both Jean and Ellen were good
friends of LaR.ae Peterson and both were concerned
n\·t~r

Cheryl

~lnn

(R. 1293). Jean stayed at Thayle's

place in Sandy while Thayle was on a trip. Thayle and
Jean had been on trips to :JI exico together.
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Glen Cahoon is a Sgt. of homicide squad .and had
testified previously. He now testified he saw Kuehne
first on January 11th. Kuehne was detained 5 or 6
hours and then put in jail over night and released the
next morning (R. 1300). Kuehne was not informed of his
constitutional rights (R. 1301). Cahoon rernemoors a
conversation regarding a possible pardon for Kuelme
on a former felony charge in Utah (R. 1302). Kuehne
was never arrested as an accessory or accomplice
though the police knew he h.ad procured and disposed of
the shells and weapon (R. 1304).) Jean Sinclair was
brought to the police station for questioning on January
9th and questioned for 2-¥2 hours. She was questioned
regarding her relationship with LaR.ae Peterson and
Don Foster (R. 1309-10). She didn't refuse to answer
any question (R. 1310). She submitted to a polygraph
test (R. 1311). She was released that evening (R. 1314).
Vaughn Humphreys was in ·on January 11th and went
with officer Longson to pick up Carl l{uehne (R. 1312).
Cahoon saw Humphreys up Emigration Canyon offering
to assist in the gun search twice prior to the date he
and Kuehne found the gun stock. Humphreys was with
Kuehne on both occasions (R. 1315). Kuehne and Humphreys came up on their own without being asked to
participate. Cahoon had a conversation with K.uehne
about the use of the National Guard troops in the search
for the gun. This conversation took place two or three
days before Kuehne and Humphreys brought the gun
stock to the police station (R. 1317).
Jean Sinclair testified she is the defendant, she
lives at 2300 South State Street, Salt Lake City, I'tah,
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and is a nursing home operator in a partnership with
Ellen RawlinH ~le llenry since 19-!7. She resides at the
nursing hmue (R. 1328). .Mrs. Rawlins, husband and
children had lived there until the children grew up and
the husband died of ~ilicosis. Jean's brother and sisterin-law crune to live with her in December, 1962 (R. 1329).
She described the physical plan of the nursing h01ne
(R. 1330-1337). She 1net Don Foster in the summer of
1962 at ·LaRae's beauty shop after Foster and LaRae
returned from Las \.,.egas. She saw Foster three or four
times in all (R. 13-!1). She was aware LaRae and Foster
had exchanged rings. She never objected to LaRae
marrying Foster (R. 1343). She never saw Foster after
LaRa.e moved out of the shop on October 6th. Jean went
to California about September 22nd to ship a horse to
Hawaii, shipping date was scheduled for September 26
t H. 1345 ).
She and LaRae discussed LaRae's leaving after
Jean returned from California in October, both over
the phone and in the shop. Foster did not bec01ne a subject of the conversation ( R. 1350). LaRae licensed the
shop for 1963 after she had moved out (R. 1350). LaRae
was brought to the rest home by Jean's partner Ellen.
'Yhen the shop was set up Jean and Ellen furnished
the room and utilities, LaRae the equipment (R. 1351-2).
La.Rae did the patients' hair and had her own business
the balance of the time (R. 1352). LaRae never stayed
there at nights (R. 1353). LaRae went with other men
many times. Two of these, Peay and Graven, had contemplated marriage with LaRae (R. 1355). Jean had
a disagreement with LaRae about the child Cheryl Ann
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ignoring LaRae and transferring her affection to Jean
and Ellen (R. 1356-7). She admitted writing the note,
Exhibit 30, in January or February, 1961, long before
LaRae met Don Foster (R. 1358). LaRae went with
many men but with Peay, Craven, Berry and Foster
more than the others. Jean never had any animosity
or resentment for these four men (R. 1360). There was
a conve,rsation with Vaughn Humphreys in Ellen's presence about possible adoption of Cheryl Ann. The subject
of adoption was brought up by Humphreys ( R. 13G2).
Humphreys carried a gun and on one occasion wanted to
lie in wait to shoot someone stealing gas from Jean's
Cabana truck (R. 1363). Jean, Ellen and Yaughn had
a discussion regarding Danites and the book "The
Twenty-Seventh Wife" but neither castration nor harm
to Foster were mentioned (R. 1365). Jean never mentioned Danites to Carl Kuehne (R. 1365).
Vaughn had wanted to go with LaRae Peterson.
Jean told him he was wasting his time, LaRae was too
expensive. Vaughn often complained with respect to
L,aRae - "Foster is getting it and I'm not" (R. 1368).
Jean and Vaughn had an argument on a hunting trip
in late November over Vaughn's vulgar language. Jean
told him to walk home and called him stupid. Vaughn
rode home with Jean and didn't come around again
until Christmas when Bill Rawlins was there (R. 1371).
She denied any conversation with Kuehne regarding a
jacket of Vaughn's (R. 1371). She had a phone conversation with Vaughn regarding his spreading rumors that
she was a Lesbian. Vaughn denied he had done this (R.
1373). Vaughn left his jacket in the truck on the last
30
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hunt and never <·anw around for it nor did he pick
it up at Chri~trwtH when II(• <'aiiiP to see Bill Hawlins
(R. 1373). .I P.an denied l'VPI' having 1nentioned hann
to Uon Foster to Pither Kuehne or lfumphreys (R. 137G) .
.Jenn nwt Kuehne in October, 1960 on a deer hunt with
\'nug-hn. He was around <><'<·asional]~· in 1961 and kept
\'Pui::-;on in J Pan 'H loekPr that fall. He came around
l'n·quPntly ~darting in August or September of 1962.
Kuehne rwvPr mentioned his prison record to Jean until
~on•mber of 196:2 (H. 1378) wJwn he was angry at his
~t1•p son for ''messing up my pardon." He threatened
to kill the hoy (R. 1379). She denied that she ever
di~(~ussed Foster with l{uehne, that she ever offered
ht> or any person money to kill or harn1 anybody (R.
l380). ~he never discussed LaR.ae Peterson or Cheryl
.\nn with Kuehne (R. 1380), nor had she been to Kearns,
the Turner house or the Susan Kay Arms with Kuehne.
LaHaP'H house in ICearns is green or grey (R. 1381) .
.lean ha~ ll<'n'r ridden past Foster's mother's house with
Kuehne. She has been to the Susan Kay apartments
twice - once during the preliminary hearing and once
with the jury during this trial (R. 1383). She usua!ly
\H'ar~ jeans or slacks and boots or oxfords around the
rt>~t home. Ellen gave her the iaeket, Exhibit 44 for
ht•r birthday. She wears it to horse shows, auctions,
and Spur meetings (R. 1386). She has bought mens
:->nit:-; for patients but has never owned one. She bought
two ~nit~ for patients in June on Main Street below

dPt'l'

Third South (R. 1387). Kuehne always had a beard
during her acquaintance with him. She went to a pawn
:->hop with Kuehne to buy a hunting knife when they
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were In town for leather. This wa~ in K ovember (H.
1389). She denied having l(uelme buy a shot gun or
shells (R. 1390). She has several guns at home including
a 12-gauge shot gun owned by Billy Rawlins. Also man~·
types of ammunition (R. 1391).
She paid Kuehne $28.00, Exhibit No 33, for leather
work on the 3rd day of January and wrote the check
sitting on the couch in Kuehne's apartment. She did
not see Kuehne on the 4th of January, the day Billy
Rawlins was hurt (R. 1394). Jean wrote the check,
Exhibit No. 33, on the couch in Kuehne's apartment
on January 3rd (R. 1428). The check Exhibit No. 37 is
a check with a higher serial number and an earlier date
(R. 1428). She did sign chec$:s for the use of the rest
home and she, Ellen or J oane would complete them.
In each of six ( 6) pairs of checks in evidence the date did
not necessarily correspond with the serial number and
time of delivery (R. 1429). Jean's back was injured in
July, 1946. She had two operations on the lower back.
She was paralyzed from the hips down for a time and
then used two canes. After the second operation she
could walk with the canes (R. 1431). She had dates with
one man .after her injury. She went to a driving range
with him but after one swing was unable to continue.
She also went bowling once in 1947 but was unable to
continue (R. 1432). She tried bowling again in June,
1962 but was unable to cmnp1ete a line (R. 1433). She
rides horses but c.annot 1nount without assistance. She
has tried to run but can't (R. 1433). She can walk up
stairs but cannot run (R. 1434). She is 5' 3-¥2" with her
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ahly weighs about 130 lbs. (R. 1433 ). ~he lost weight
IIIO~t rapidly in OdobPr, 1961 anu ~larch, 19()2 while
lun·ing dental trouble (R. 1079).
~he

had a conversation with Htmlphreys in July,
Hili~ regarding police officers and adoption of Cheryl
Ann. Vaughn started the conversation and both the
police and adoption ideas were his (R. 1437). She did
not see Kuehne on January 4th. She was first aware
of Thayle Olsen and Ellen hiring a detective on January
i)th when they told her (R. 1438). On January 4th she
went to the Lunt Motel to see Bill Rawlins between 5 :30
and 6:00 p.m. (R. 1438). She went in the Roadmaster
Buick, talked to Billy and his wife and saw his child.
8he was there 20 to 30 minutes and returned to the
re~t home to get epsom salts to soa:k Bill's broken finger.
~lw left the epsmn salts on the door step when Bill
and his wife wPre out and returned to the rest home (R.
1439). She arrived hon1e while ~Etch 1\tfiller was on
TY, ate pizza, worked on the books and watched rrv.
Her brother and sister-in-law were there. Her brother
went to bed shortly after TV went off. She and Mildred
fed the dogs and put out the patient pills. Mildred went
to bed about 2:30 a.m. (R. 1441) January 5th. She saw
Reva start down the stairs from the nursing home proper
around 10:00 o'clock. She received a call from her bookkeeper Bessie Anderson after 10:00 o'clock (R. 1441).
There are four telephones in the rest home.

Jean called Ellen at the bowling alley regarding the
injury to Billy about 9:30 (R. 1442). 'That night Jean
was wearing western riding pants, a light green shirt
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and light jacket. She owns a blue s:ki parka which Hhl·
had worn in Sandy .and on deer hunts with Carl K.uelme
and Vaughn Humphreys (R. 1444). She owns a full
length light tan leather coat but no cloth trench coat.
She took cleaning to :M~urray January 5th about 10:30 to
11:00 o'clock. 'The cleaning belonged to both she and
the patients and included a trench coat (R. 1444). The
coat is probably still at the rest home (R. 1445). She
has ne~ver fired a shot gun (R. 1446). She did not shoot
Foster nor conspire with Kuehne to shoot :B'oster (R.
1446).
On cross examination she testified she changed her
name in 1959 in the Third District Court. She is J5
years old, has worn her hair short for many years. She
wears both shirts and slacks, and dresses. Dresses when
out or working away from the rest home (R. 1447). She
has known Humphreys for 15 years along with Ellen's
boys and has had problems with Vaughn and his vulgar
mouth (R. 1449-51). Vaughn wanted LaRae and other
girls (R. 1452). Jean went to California around September 22, 1962 to deliver a horse (R. 1455). She stopped
in Las Vegas at a motel, paid cash, and the next day
drove to the Pales Verdes hills, stabled the horse and
she stayed in Hollywood. She contacted Matson Lines
to arrange shipment (R. 1455 ). "'Tent to her brother'~
in Chula Vista, California, brought her brother and
brother's horse back to Salt Lake (R. 1456). She knows
Thayle Olsen and Thayle was with her when she bought
two (2) suits for patients at a sale. She kept one suit
and returned the other. She paid cash. She bought the
suits because the patients were small and needed short
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ja1·k\'t:-'. ShP trit>d on the jaC'kets. I )op;-;n't renH·mher about
tht• pant. rrhay}p gave infonnation for delivPry-Exhibit
;,;; (H. l·Hi-l). XPither the coat nor pant~ were altered

to fit her (R. 1465). She has only been accused of being
a I.. esbian in this court room (R. 1466). \Yhen asked as
to "houw~Pxual ad~ on LaHae Peterson or she witl1
you" ~he claimPd privilege. Slw \nl~ never at the Susan
Kay Arms prior to her arrest (R. 1465). She admitted
l·>dtihit :m wa~ her hand \\Titing. She had written the
note after a heated discussion with LaR.ae about Cheryl
Ann·~ neglect and transfer of affection. Jean clai1ned
privilege under the 5th amendment to three questions
regarding the note (Exhibit 30) (R. 1472). The note
was written prior to when L.aRae met Foster (R. 1473).
LaRae was going with Cravens at the time of the note.
She had advised LaRae to 1narry Craven to nlake a honw
for Cheryl Ann (R. 1474).
Jean was at Kuehne's on December 28th with the
witne~s \Yetzel. She brought a fifth of Irish whiskey
for LaRae Kuehne. Jean had a sip of wine. She left
the bottle with Kuehne for his wife (R. 1478). She went
to sleep on the eouch and left at 7:00a.m. the next morning (R. 1479). Jean and I(uehne went hunting on December 30th. She saw him at the rest home on New·
Year·~ En' with three (3) other people (R. 1480), and
tli(l not spe him again until January 3rd (R. 1481). She
explained check procedure on the rest home accounts
(R. 1482-86). Vaughn Humphreys was having dinner
with Bill Rawlins and his wife when Jean left the epsom
salts (R. 1491). Jean was not .aware prior to January
:lth that Thayle Olsen had hired a detective (R. 1494).
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She has passed Foster's 1nother's place on her way to
J oane's but doesn't know what day. She did not drive
back and forth (R. 1498). She has not been able to move
faster than a walk since 1946 and has to glance down
when walking. She swims, has not golfed but went to a
driving range when she took one swing and quit (R.
1500). She :knows Colonel Olson, drill master of the
Silver Spurs. She doesn't saddle her own horse. She
tries to do the drills (R. 1505) but has dropped out of
several drills (R. 1507). She wrote a check for the horse's
board in California on September 29, 1962. The check,
Exhib~t No. 57, \Vas the board for 5 da~·s (H. 1512).
Jean explained the narcotic procedure at the rest home
(R. 1517-24). She saw Reva Nelson coming down the

stairs at 10:00 o'clock on January 4th (R. 1525). She
saw Thelma Eatchell when she was fixing Austin's 1 :00
o'clock shot. She did not change clothes on the night

of January 4th or early morning of the 5th other than
shoes (R. 1536). Don Foster was not mentioned while
she was on the polygraph at the police station (R. 1542).

At .a recess counsel made Motion for a mistrial on
the basis of a magazine article in Startling Detective distributed in the Salt Lake area during the trial although
it was a July issue. (See R. 1546 et seq)
She fell in the bathtub while in iail and injured her
back (R. 1584). The stairs from the rest home to the
basement living quarters are so set up that you can see
progressively larger portions of the hall with each step
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taken down tltP stain; (It l;>nt). You can't see into the
rest home living romn from the hallway (R. 1566).
Morgan l •aeP testified he :knows Don Foster, LaHaP
and ,Jean Sinel.air. He has seen fringed leather
jackets similar to Jean'H, Exhibit -1--1-, at the Susan ICay
Arms on otiH•r women.
Pl'tPr~on

\Yilliant \Vyler testified he is a loan officer at
Zion~ Savings & Loan, Brig. Gen. USNG retired, has
known Jean since 19-!-! or 1945. H(:•r reputation in the
community as to being peaceable is good.
Buell G. Bryan identified shot gun Exhibit D-59 and
:-;hot gun shell, Exhibit D-60, frmn the rest home and
demonstrated the gun could be loaded and has a firing
pin.
Dewey Fillis, police officer, testified he is captain in
(·harge of detectives. \.,..aughn Humphreys approached
him \Yednseday, January 9th at a bowling alley with
regard to Jean Sinclair and informed him Jean had
approached Humphreys and Kuehne about the FosterPeterson relationship. Hmnphreys was present during
Kuehne interrogation and may have entered into the
inkrrogation (R. 1581). Fillis had a conversation with
Kuehne about a pardon for a former felony (R. 1583).
Kuehne told Fillis he had purchased the shot gun, had
been three (3) places with Sinclair to determine best
place to shoot Foster - had shown her how to load the
gl.m- had sawed off the gun- had emptied the shells,
and had disposed of the gun shells. Kuehne was never

.,-
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placed under arrest (R. 1585-86). \Vhen <-ruestioned why
he had not placed Kuehne under arrest, an objection
was sustained by the Court (R. 1585). No complaint was
ever filed against l{uehne.
Richard C. Dibblee testified he \vas chief criminal
deputy of Salt Lake County Attorney's office in charge
of the Sinclair case through preliminary hearing. He
authorized the complaint signed against l\iiss Sinclair.
He knew of Kuehne's statement - that K~uehne hau
gone various places to determine the best place to shoot
Foster. He had purchased the gun - sawed it off taken the loads out of 24 shells prior to the killing showed Jean how to load the gun and later disposed of
the gun and shells (R. 1591). When asked why he didn't
have a complaint signed against Kuehne, the Court sustained the District Attorney's objection as being immaterial (R. 1592).
Bessie Anderson testified she is an auditor for the
State Tax Commission and has iknown Jean since 1950.
She had handled the nursing home taxes for the past
three years (R. 1592). On January 4th at about 10.30
she called Jean at the nursing home and had a discussion
with her with regard to quarterly taxes (R. 1594). The
business had to do with returns due January 31st (R.
1595). She places the time by the 10:00 o'clock news on
January 4th (R. 1596) and the date by dismantling of
her Christmas tree. She frequently called Jean at night
because that was the only time she could get her (R.
1593).
38
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.Madi~on ll. Thomas is a plly~it·ian ~peeializing in
neurology and ha~ been ePrtified in his specialty since
1949; is a member of the staff of the LDS 1-Iospital
tUld is comm.ltant to thP l'tah State llospital and 'Yyoming ~tatt' Hospital (H. 139G). lie examined Jean Sindail' on l~\·hntary 13th and reviewed the hospital records
relative to two (~) spinal surgeries in 1946 (H. 1397).
~he Ita~

impainnent of lwr lower extre1nities and
impairment of the buttocks and saddle area (H.
t:)!tS). ~ht• ha~ an impaired walk. No running could be
lllit·ited. He would not expect a person in her condition
to be able to run over an area without a grotesque or
~toopt>tl appearance (R. 14023). He talked with Dr.
~tPwart \Y right who had done one of the spinal operations on Jean Sinclair. It would seem unlikely for her
to be able to run in the usual fashion, but not impossible
to run (R. 1-11-l-). The ankle jerk is entirely laclring in
the left ankle and just perceptible in the right (R. 1417) .
.\ person under stress with a neurological disability will
at tempt things beyond what he has learned is his limit
and will stu1nble or fall and his performance may be
worse instead of better. It is In ore likely that a person
with a neurological disability could 1nove faster over
nn area in which they could see where they were putting
their feet than over a dark area (R. 1419).

~Pnsory
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REBUTTAL
LaVon Turner testified she is Don :B--,oster'~ mother
and lives at 47 'Vest Sunset Avenue which is lwt\\'een
Main Street and West Temple. On Father's Day, 1!)():2,
she had her son Don, LaRae Peterson and Cheryl Ann
Peterson to dinner. She saw a blue and white station
wagon driving by the house a couple of times very
slowly. (R. 1605). Her hmne is about one and one-half
blocks west of Jean's nursing home and several blocks
south (R. 1604). She doesn't know whether the Buick
was a Roadmaster, Century or Super (R. 1604). She
identified Exhibit No. 50, the defendant'~ station wagon
as the car she saw but said the top ·was white and the
bottom was blue. The station wagon in the exhibit is
blue over white (R. 1605).
Mel Humphreys testified he lives at 2164 South 4th
East, Salt Lake City, Utah and is Justice of the Peace.
He is the father of \T aughn Humphreys. One of his two
(2) automobiles is a 1954 Chevrolet sedan with a light
blue body and an off-white top bearing 1963 rtah license
number DD 9207 (R. 1607). No one but he ever drives
the automobile. His son \' aughn has a 1955 Chevrolet
sedan with the same colors (R. 1610).
Floyd Bertleson testified he was with John Storey
and two (2) girls at the Susan Kay apartments when
they heard a shot and a scream. After seeing Foster
was shot he went to his own car, got a derringer and went
back to the Foster car. He did not receive a gun from
LaRae Peterson, nor was he between the chain link fence
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and the car whilP he had his gun. (Tlw dPrringer w.as not
offered in t•vidPne<•.)

Vidor L. Olsen i~ an ex-cavalry man retireu fr01n
the army. He is drill master for the Silver Spurs riding
organization. Jean Sinclair belonged to the Silver Spurs.
liP dP~·wrilwd the exercises and drills the Silver Spurs
went through and said Jean participated (R. 1623-24).
lie has never ~wen Jean 1nount or dis1nount from a horse
(R. 1628).
LaRae Kuehne, previously sworn, testified in rehuttal and ~tated, over objection, that Mildred Sinclair
hnd told he-r aftPr the killin,v; ··~·ou know, LaRae, even
if sis wasn't there that night :\Iond and I would say
she was'' (R. 1633). The \vitness can't re1ne1nber her
own part of the conversation but could remen1ber what
~[ildred said .. b~ause I went hon1e and \\Tote it down"
(R. 1635 ).
Bruno F. Romano, private detective, testified that
Thayle Olsen hired him to foUow Don Foster. The Court,
over objection, allowed Rmnano to repeat the substances
of the conversations with Thayle Olsen (R. 1637 -38).
Yaughn Humphreys, recalled, testified he had seen
Jean get on and off a horse at various times (R. 1642).
That he has a fawn colored three-quarter length trench
coat (R. 1647).
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Beth Foster testified regarding telephone conver:-;ations with ·Thayle Olsen relative to Foster and LaRaP
Peterson (R. 1649-50). 1\Irs. Foster and her husband
had never made plans to finish the divorce and she was
still keeping books for Foster at the time of his death
(R. 1652).
Reva Nelson testified that she worked at Jean's rest
home and knows both J e.an and Ellen. She worked
January 4th until 10 :00 p.m. when Thelma Ea tchell came
on to relieve her (R. 1655). At about 8 :20 p.m. she saw
M:ildred Sinclair and Jean in the kitchen. Mildred wm;
warming pizz.a for Jean. Reva came down stairs again
at 10 :10, she got her coat and went home . She did not
see anyone hut could hear people talking in the living
room (R. 1658). She said you can't see 1nuch of the
hall from the top of the stair hut can see a little more
with e.ach step you take down.
Tim Monroe, News Eidtor for I<:CPX-TV, showed
moving picture films, Exhibit Nos. 62 and 63, of the defendant walking from the jail to the courthouse on
January 21, 196.3, and from the courthouse to the jail
April 15, 1963.
Kermit DuBois testified he is a clothing salesman at
English Tailors. He saw J e.an Sinclair last June or
July in the Salt Lake City store with another lady. Jean
was dressed in riding trousers and perhaps a iacket.
She bought two (2) suits. He identified Exhibit Nos.
53 and 54 as s.ales slips for the purchases. He thought
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a man (H. lli'-1::). He te~tified that he fitted
both suits on lwr but admitted that one had been returned and when the District Attorney had her try
the suit coat on admitted it did not fit. (The suit coat
was not admitted in evidence.)

:;lw was

LaRue

Peter~on

t·alled in rebuttal, said she did not

give anyone a pistol at the scene of the shooting on

January 5th. rrhe only thing she picked up was Foster's
keys (R. 1697). Pearl .l\faxfield picked up Don's cigarPUPs (R. 1696). Foster had many guns in the apartment.
liP earried a 38-revolver in hiH brief case which was
nol11Ullly in the car.
Thelma Eatchell knows Jean Sinclair; has worked
at thP n'st honw frmn J ul~,, 1961 to January, 1963 when
8lw quit (R. 1700). On January 4, 1963, she came to
work at 10 :00 p.m. and relieved Reva Nelson. Narcotic
shots werP given to patients on order left on the patient
chart and she recorded the day and the time the shots
were given. The narcotic chart was in the hall of the
living quarters by the sterilizer (R. 1705 ). In preparing
a ~hot the syringe had to be boiled for 3 minutes and
then allowed to cool (R. 1707). She heard voices in the
living room when she prepared a shot shortly after 10:00
p.m. on January -1-th but didn't recognize them (R. 1710).
At .about twenty (20) minutes to 12, January 4th, she
called down the dumbwaiter for ~Iildred three (3) times
hut got no answer (R. 1750). She talked to Lamond
Sinclair when ~he came on at 10 :00 p.m. She saw Jean's
le~~ and feet at the bottom of the stairs at about 1 :20
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a.m., January 5th when she went down to prepare a shot
of Demerol for patient Harris. After she had given the
shot to Harris she came down the stairs again and
talked to Jean. She said Jean had changed clothes.
After she talked to Jean she proceeded to get out the
D·emerol for May Austin's 1:00 a.m. shot (R. 1722).
After she gave the second shot she came down and made
the entrance on the narotic sheet at 1:30 a.m. (R. 1724).
The nursing notes, Exhibit D-67, show May Austin was
given her shot before Harris was given his. The Austin
shot is charted at 1 :00 a.m. Both shots were given
after she saw Jean's legs at the foot of the stairs (H.
1743). You can't see the kitchen door from the top of
the stair but can see a little more of the hall each time
you take a step down (R. 144). When Thelma saw Jean's
legs Jean was wearing blue levis and cowboy boot~.
Thelma testified the times on the nursing charts are
wrong but admits they are her hand writing. She can't
recollect what she did nor to whom she gave shots on
shifts either prior to January 4th or shifts subsequent
to January 4th or 5th (R. 1749-50).
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POINT I
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO GRANT DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS AT THE END OF THE
STATE'S CASE.
POINT II
THE COURT ERRED IN DENYING DEFENDANT'S
MOTION FOR A DIRECTED VERDICT.
POINT III
THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO INSTRUCT THE
JURY THAT CARL KUEHNE WAS AN ACCOMPLICE AS
A ~lATTER OF LAW.

The defendant moved to dismiss at the end of the
~tatP•s rase on the grounds that Carl Kuehne was an
areomplrice as a Inatter of la'v and that his testimony
had not been corroborated (R. 1016, et seq). The defendant further moved for a directed verdict when both
parties had rested on the same reasons and grounds
and thereafter requested that the Court instruct the
jury Umt Carl Kuehne was an accomplice as a matter
of law. The Court denied both motions and thereafter
denied a similar motion as one of the bases for defendant'~ motion for a new trial.
These poinb .are so interrelated that they are argued
under one heading.
76-1--1-J., Vtah Code Annotated 1953 defines pnn-

cipals, has the effect of making aiders and abettors
principals and does away ·with accessories before the fact.
The Code further obviates the necessity of persons being
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at the scene of the crin1e to 1na:ke one an aider and
abettor. The statute reads as follo\vs:
·• All persons concerned in the commission of
a crime, either felony or misdemeanor, whether
they directly corn1nit the act constituting the
offense or aid and abet in its commission or, not
being present, have advised and encouraged its
commission, and all persons counseling, advising
or encouraging children under the age of fourteen years, lunatics or idiots to coimnit any crime,
and all persons who by fraud, contrivance or
force occasion the drunkenness of another for
the purpose of causing him to commit any crime,
or who by threats, 1nenaces, command or coercion
compel another to commit any crime, are principals in any crime so committed."
77-31-18, U.C.A. 1953, provides that a defendant
cannot he convicted on the uncorroborated testimony of
an accomplice. See Point IV citing cases. Kuehne's own
evidence makes him an aider and abettor and therefore
an accomplice. The question of who is an accomplice
is a question of law for the Court.
"The question of who is an accomplice within
the rule requiring corroboration of their testimony is a question of law for the Court \Yhere the
facts as to witnesses' participation are clear and
undisputed and one of fact for the jury where
such facts are subject to different inferences."
Stat.e v. Ripley, 189 Tenn. 681, 227 S\V 2d 26,
19 A.L.R. 1347 with Ann.
"Where the facts are in a dispute or where
the acts and conduct of the witness are admitted,
it be·comes a question of lavY for the Court to say
whether those acts and fact make the witness an
46
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19 ~ \. L.R. 1;~;>;> <'iting ea~P~. L~tah
u.ppnlvp:-; the above. ~PP Slate r. Corales, I±

lH'<'ollt pli<·e.''

Utah 9-1-1, :217 P. :.W:3; State ~-. 8u1t1rr.-,·, 97 L:tah
.-l-W, 90 1'. :27:3.

In the instant <·a:-;e there is no conflict in what the
ad~ done hy K.uehne were and they are subject to only
one inferencP, that he aided and assisted in preparation
for the killing of Don Foster. According to his testimony,
he went three (3) different places with the defendant
to advise her of the best place to shoot Foste-r (R. 539-10--11, 603, ti:2-1-, ()1-1-75-76). He purchased a gun and
shell:-; at her request. Doing so, he gave a false name
and address because "he knew what she was going to use
the gun l'or" (R. 683). At the tin1e he bought the gun
he knew the defendant already had a shot gun (R. 684).
He knew it was her "avowed purpose to :kill Don Foster"
(H. 716). He sawed off the gun at her request on the
night of January ±th (R. 626). He en1ptied :24 of the
~.) ~hells before the shooting in preparation to disp<>se of
them (R. ti:2S-:29). He shaved off his beard because he
thought the cops would be after her and get hi1n for the
killing. He procured an alibi witness because she was
going to shoot Foster on Dece1nber 28th. He expressed
no ~urprise when she arrived at his home after the shooting and ordered hiin to dispose of the gun and shells
because he was an accomplice before and after the fact.
He admittedly knew the object of each step of the preparation. He did not atten1pt to withdraw from the scheme
or plan a:3 late as January 4th ·when she left his apartnwnt to "kill n1yself a son-of-a-bitch."
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As set forth above, 76-1-44, U.C.A. 1953 makes aiders
and abettors principals and obviates the necessity of
presence .at the crime. Aiding and abetting "means to
assist the perpetrator of the crime." U.S. v. vVi1liams,
71 S. Ct. 59·5, 341 U.S. 58, 95 L. Ed. ------·
Aiding and abetting and concealing are not mere
terms for presupposing the e~istence of an argument
but such terms have a broader application making a defendant a principal \vhen he consciously shares in a
criminal act regardless of existence of a conspiracy. Peraria v. U.S., 74 S. Ct. 358, 347 U.S. 1, 98 L. Ed. ------·
To instigate means to aid, promote, or encourage
commission of an offense and one of its synonyms is abet.
Nye & Nissen v. U.S., 168 F. 2d 846, Aff. 698 S. Ct. 766,
336 U.S. 613. A person aiding and abetting in commission of a crime can be convicted .as principal under statute without regard to conspiracy or concert of action.
Nye & Nissen v. U.S., supra. A defendant aids or abets
a person in committing an unlawful .act so as to be guilty
as a principal by aiding such person by acts or encouraging such person by words with knowledge of the
wrongful purpose of such person. People v. LaGrant
(Cal.), 172 P. 2d 554). See also People v. Cowan, 101
P. 2d 125; People v. Green (Wash.), 221 P. 2d 127. One
aiding in or ·abetting by word or deed preparation for
or encouraging an unlawful act resulting in another's
death, is as guilty as the person committing the crime.
Cline v. State, 148 S. 172, 25 Ala. App. 143. Criminal
responsibility as at common law extends to any person
who assists in the commission of the offense, counsels or
48
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pro(·un•s in the committing or assisb in the conunission
of tht- offense . .Ar/kins u. CunuJioJIIn'alth, 9 ~E 2d 349,
t::t .\. L.R. 131:2.
'rhe following cases do not re<1uire presence .at the
<'riliH'. Crow v. State, 79 SW 2d 75, 190 Ark. :222, a nlurdt>r <'H.SP. Not present but a principal. People v. Williams, :2-lS P. l07S, a California case. Not present but
nid~r .and abettor. State v. Robinett, 279 S\V 697 (Tex.),
homici<lt> Pncouraged by acts or deeds advising and coun~eling though not at scene. State c. Allison, 156 SE 54 7,
~tlO XC 190. Defendant gave gun to parmnour that he
might escape. A sheriff was killed in the escape. She
was guilty as an accessory though not present. State c.
Smith, :281 SW 285.
There are numerous holdings that a single act prior
to a erime and a-way from the place of comn1ission are
~nfficient to constitute one an accomplice or principal.
~\ person made a key for principals in a theft from a
railroad car; held guilty as an accon1plice. Bass v. State,
ti~ s'v 2d 127.
~[iss Sinclair took the stand and denied any criminal
connection with Kuehne.

"The fact that the defendant takes the stand
and denies any connection with the erime or with
the witness does not, however, create a disputed
fact set up within the rule so as to require submission of the question to the jury as the evidence
in regard to the witnesses' connection with the
crime i~ otherwise uncontested." Carter v. State
(Okla.), :28 P.2d 581, Ann. at 19 .A.L.R. 1354.
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There is no conflict as to Kuelme's participation
as an aider and abettor other than the defendant's denial
of her connection with Kuehne and his staten1ent that hP
didn't think she was going to do it, as she had threatened
before.
It is pointed out that at the end of the State's ea~c·
when the Motion to Dismiss was made there was no conflict whatsoever.
It was error to submit the question of law to the
jury. It should have been determined as a matter of
law and either defendant's motion for a directed verdict
granted or the question of corroborating evidence should
have been submitted to the jury under proper instructions as stated in Carter v. State, supra, Ann. 19 A.L.R.
2d at page 135-t.
"Submitting the question of accomplicity to
a jury may confuse them. They might erroneously
conclude that an accomplice in fact is not an accomplice and return a verdict of guilty without
sufficient corroboration, which they might not
have done if they had understood clearly that the
witness was as a matter of law an accomplice and
that corro boration was necessary."
1

McKinney v. State, C.C.A. Okla., 201 P. 673, is a
very clearly reasoned case with regard to instructions
on accomplices. The Court states at page 676:
"Where the evidence showing that persons
are accomplices is undisputed, the issue is one of
law, and not of fact" citing Cudjoe v. St.ate, 12
Okla. Criminal 246, 154 P. 500, L.R.A. 1916 F.,
1251.
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Tlw Court further

~tatPs

at pagP (i77:

.. r,or tllP error of the Court in failing to
the jury, a~ a nmtter of law, that Tidwell
was an ae<'omplice, and for failing to give appropriatt· instructions a~ to whPther ~lrs. Gregory
\Hts an (H'l'Onlpli<'P, this case is reversed and remanded."
in~t rud

It is intPrPsting to note that 1\Irs. Gregory's only
participation in tlw crime \\·as furnishing one of the
prineipab w;th l'ood while he was waiting for a conn•nient tillll' to commit the robbery charged. The only
reason the Court held that there was a question of fact
regarding :Mrs. Gregory's accomplicity was due to a
statute, Revised Laws of Oklahoma 2099, creating a
presmnption that she was acting under duress on the
part of her husband. See also Winfield &. State, 44 Texas
Criminal -!7."i, 7:2 S\Y 182:
"\YhPre the undisputed evidence indicates
that the witnt-ss is an accomplice, the trial Court
has a right to charge the jury that the \Vitness
is an a(·complirP. Such charge is not on the weight
of the evidence nor erroneous, and renders unneces~ary any charge defining the law of accomplirity."
The Court's instructions No. 9 and 10 n1ade this
ronfusion eYen more likely. See Point VII, this brief.
This is especially true in a case such as that on an appeal
where the entire fourteen days of testimony were infected with the innuendo of a homosexual relationship
between the defendant and another witness, and the defendant was, in fact, being tried on a question of homoSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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sexuality rather than homicide. Cases in our State, without exception, hold that corroboration of an accomplice':-;
testimony is necessary, and that evidence showing motive
or to cast grave suspicion on the defendant are not sufficient to corroborate. See Point IV.
The State's contention has been that Carl Kuelme
\Yas not an accomplice because he had no crin1inal intent,
or in the alternative, that he didn't think that Jean Sinclair was going to kill Foster. The question of criminal
intent is clear arising from his guilty knowledge of the
purpose for which the gun was purchased, for which it
was sawed off, why the shells were unloaded, that "she
was going to kill herself a son-of-a-bitch," and that ''sonof-a-bitch" was Don Foster.
The question of intent and criminal intent is discussed fully in Point VII. The intent is presumed. See
State v. Owen, 119 Ore. 15, 244 P. 560; Commonwealth v.
Lowry, 374 P. 594, 98 At. 2d 733, Certiorari Denied, 347
U.S. 914, 98 L. Ed. 1017, 74 S. Ct. 479. It is immaterial
whether the aider and abettor has any direct or personal
interest in the results of the crime or whether he will
gain in any way thereby. U.S. v. Mass, 122 Fed. Supp.
523, reversed on other grounds. Cir. 3rd, 220 F. 2d 166.
If one person assisted another in doing a criminal
act, it is presumed he shared the intent with which the
person was doing the act. Wharton's Cri1ninal Evidence,
12th Ed., Vol. 1, page 246. If a person advising or
c.ounseling the crime changes his mind he is still liable
as an accessory if he does not inform the principal of
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hi~

changed desires. Stall' r. ~lllen, -l-7 Conn. 121, \Yharton·~ C.L. & P .. 12th Ed. ~:3D.
"In order to be an aeet>ssory before the fact
it i:-; IIP<'P~~a rY that the actor :know that he is
taking a step. to prmnote the co1nn1ission of a
crimP. l t i~ not necessary that the accomplice before the t'ad have full knowledge of all the details
of tlw eriminal plan or the identity of all persons
partieipating therein. It is not necessary that the
defendant should have originated the design of
committing the offense if the principal had previou~ly formed the design, and the alleged accomplice encouraged him to carry it out by falsehood
or otherwise, he is guilty as an accessory before
the fact." \Vharton's 12th Ed., citing K eeleher v.
State, 10 Smedes & ~1 (Mis~.) 192.
POINT IV
THERE IS NO EVIDENCE TO CORROBORATE CARL
KUEHNE'S TESTIMONY.

The law is well settled in this State, both by statute
and <·asP, that the defendant cannot he convicted on
the testin10ny of an accomplice unless sufficiently corroborated by evidence tending to connect the defendant
\\ith the crime unaided by any inference from the testimony of the accomplice, and that it is not enough that
~uch testimony show motive or possible motive or cast
grave suspicion on the accused. 77-31-18, U.C.A. 1953;
State t:. Iru·in, 101 rtah 365, 120 P. 2d 285; State v.
Br!lener, lOG l-;-tah 49, 14 P. 2d 302; State ~-. So-nwrs,
97 l·tah 13:2, SO P. :2d :273; State r. Gardner, 27 P. 2d 51,
eiting some thirty trtah cases.
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The evidence must be to some 1naterial matter or
fact which is inconsistent with innocence of the defendant ... the evidence 1nust do 1nore than (•reate a
suspicion of the defendant's guilt, State v. Laris, 78 l!tall
183, 2 P. 2c1283, and it is not enough to establish a motiYP
merely, Goodwin v. CommonweaUh, 256 Ky. 1, 73 S\V
2d 567, unless there is corroborating evidence of a material fact tending to connect the defendant with tlw
commission of the crime the Court should direct a verdict. People v. Veits, 79 Cal. App. 576, 250 P. 588; State
v. ArhanNc, 196 Iowa 223, 194 NW 209, both cited in
Stat,e v. Somers, supra. The evidence is not corroborative if it needs interpretation and directon from the testiInony of the accused. People v. Thurmond (Cal.), 338 P.
2d 473.

A careful scrutiny of the extensive record in the case
on appeal shows it to be completely devoid of evidence
to connect Jean Sinclair with the killing of Don Foster.
There is no single fact or group of facts that connect
her to the crin1e.
The State contended on argument of defense counsel's Motion to Dismiss (R. 1025 et seq):
(a) There are sufficient facts to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that Jean Sinclair had a sufficient
motive to kill Don Foster.
(b) That Vaughn Humphreys' testimony regarding
a discussion of Danites and a threat of castration to Don
Foster shows an act calculated to inflict great bodily
1
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harm and <·onnpd:-; ,Jpan Sinclair to the <·riine charged
iudt•pPlHIPnt of K twhne':-; tP~I imony.
~l')

That (lprritadina Umnbee':-; testinwny that :-;he
~aw tJw <h•I'Pndant walking away fr01n the driveway south
of the SuS'an Kay Aparbnents smne weeks prior to the
:-;hooting wlwn combined with .\1 i~~ Hinclair's denial that
=-ht• had hePn then•, tends to connect her to the crin1e.
(d) That taking a coat with spots on it to the
<·leaner~ on ,January 5th tends to connect the defendant
to tlw criine. On motion for directed verdict the State
:-;ubmittPd the question to the Court without argun1ent,
ma!king no additional clailns of corroboration (R. 1851;>~).

Di~wussing

these items individually:

(a) \Yhile there is testilnony aside fron1 that of
Kuehne showing a concern for LaRae Peterson's child
due to LaRae's association with the deceased, and there
are inferenees arising from innuendo of a hmnosexual
relationship between the defendant and LaRae Peterson
whieh i~ substantiated only by unwarranted inference
from refusal to answer questions on the ground of privilege, there is also similar inference of motive or possible
motiYe in several other persons: \'"aughn IIu1npherys
from his desires for LaRae Peterson, Ellen :McHenry in
her concern for the Peterson child, Thayle Olsen in hiring a detectiYe to follow LaRae Peterson. Possible motive i~ entirely consistent with innocence and the Ftah
l'll~t·~ hold without exception that establishment of moSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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tive is not sufficient to corroborate. State
supra.

'L'.

Somers,

(b) The State claimed Yaughn IIumphreys testified
that the defendant propositioned him to disguise aH
Danites and assist she and Carl ICuehne to castrate
Foster, and contends this is a threat to Foster which
tends to eonnect her to the crime. On the interesting
theory as set out by ~1r. Banks (R. 1025):
''Here's a place where .Jfr. Hatch and I don't
agree, but you'll re-call Vaughn :Humphreys' testimony as to his stating that Jean Sinclair contacted him and propositioned him to go along
with herself and Carl ICuehne and castrate him.
Now, you n1ight on the surface say that only goes
to motive. I don't agree with that for this reason.
It shows an act to inflict great bodily injury upon
him which is included in murder in the second
degree. Even though you don't have an intent to
kill, you have an intent to inflict great bodily injury which may result in death.
"For instance, supposing you castrated too
far. Left there. Bleeds to death. Dies of shock.
That's just an example."
This is neither the law nor the faet. An examination of
Humphreys' testin1ony indicates that the conversation
referred to was not a request to do any affirmative act
but merely a statement arising fron1 the discussion of
a book, and even construed at its worst, did not contemplate or intend bodily harn1 to Foster but a suggested
means of frightening him. The applicable conversation
is set forth at R. 733-34:
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".\. \Vt>ll, it waH shortly ju~t hPfnre deer season.
She got me aside one night and she said 'H tnnphreys(~.

\Vas this down at the house again?
A. Again always in her house.

Q. \Vas anyone else
A. Xo.

present~

Q. \Yill you tell us what was said '?
.\. She said she'd been reading a:bout some religion, Dani tes or Dani tes or something and
they were smne religion that didn't believe in
-1 don't know what they didn't believe in, but
she ~aid they purged the non-believers by castration. And she s,aid that-she said,· You know,
it would be a good idea if you and I and Carl
K~uehne would put some masks on some night
and play like these Danites and go catch Don
Foster and pull his pants down and put a knife
to his testicles and tell him if he didn't leave
LaRae Peterson alone that he'd lose them.'
And then she said, •He wouldn't be wanting
to screw her any more if he thought he was
going to lose those, would he'' And I said,
·King, you're nuts.' I said, 'It's utterly ab~
surd. I don't want anything to do with it.' It
sounded too fantastic for me to believe that
someone would tell me something like that."
The conversation, if it happened, took place son1e months
before the crime and the only possibility of connection
would go to motive as heretofore discussed.
(c) Gerritadina C01nbee testified to seeing a woman
whom ~he identified as the defendant walk out of the
driveway south of the Susan I\.:ay apartment house some
two to three week8 prior to the killing (R. 903). Her
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only identification ·was fron1 a right rear view. She admits she never saw the face, could describe no part of
the apparel ·but the leather jacket, and only saw the rear
oblique vie·w for a few steps (R. 921). The State contends that this is sufficient to independently connect
her to the crime in that vicinity several weeks later, but
see State v. Baum, 47 Utah 7, 151 P. 518. This is a burglary case wherein two acc01nplices testified the defendant was with them on the burglary. Fifty-four
bottles of beer, a number of cans of corn and peas, and
some jars of fruit were t~ken. The accomplices ~testified
they hid them in brush near a trail on or near a ranch
occupied by the defendant. About a "'eek or ten days
after that, two jars of fruit taken from the cellar were
found hidden in the brush. About eighteen empty beer
bottles were found in defendant's house, but it was not
shown that they were the bottles taken from the cellar.
A boy about eight years of age testified that he saw one
of the accomplices and the defendant in the daytimP
with a horse and buggy drive into the brush, where
the fruit jars were found, and heard ·what sounded
like the rattle of bottles in a sack. He did not see
anything taken in or out of the buggy. The accomplice,
seeing the boy, told him to get for home, that he
was snooping around to steal something, and he didn't
want to catch him there any more. The Court held that
this was not sufficient corroboration. Also see State r.
Somers, supra, .an arson case wherein the defendant was
seen in the company of the accomplice within a half hour
of the fire and was seen within a block of the fire within
an hour before the fire. Held insufficient corroboration.

58

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

PHIJJ!t·

v. 1,/il(nllolul, supra, where the defendanl wa:-;

to h.ave ht•en in tlw apartment where the eri1nes
wen· committt-d many t inw:-; during the period over which
tlw crinll':-; (ad:-; of pern•rsion under California Penal
('odt> ~~S(a) wt-n~ alleged to have bePn co1nmitted. IIeld
insufficient corroboration in spite of contradictory admi~~ions hy tilt- defendant.

;-;hown

(d) The State contends the fact that Jean Sinclair
took certain artiele~ of clothing to the cleaners on J anuar~· rlth conned~ her directly to the crime, and much
ado i:-; nul.<lP ahout certain grease t-\pots on a trench
eoat. among the articles taken to the cleaners. 'rithout
interpretation or direction from the testimony of the accomplice, there is nothing to connect either the spots or
the coat to the crime. In fact, if l{uehne's testimony
i~ worthy of belief, he didn't know the condition of the
t•oat when she left his home at 11 :00 p.m. on January
4th prior to the killing (R. 578-79). He stated at line 26,
"~he went to the car and got what I later
ll:'arued "·a~ a white coat, wrapped the gun in it,
and ~aid slw was going to kill herself a son-of-abitch that night." (Emphasis added)

A~nin at R. 585, speaking of the coat after defendant's
return at 1:00 o'clock:

"l seem to recollect that it was smudged with
a bit of grease and dust."

'Yhen asked if he recollected where the grease and dust
were located, he replied,

··x ot too well. I'd hate to make a definite
statement on it" (R. 585).
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Spots on the coat n1ean nothing without being given direction and interpretation in the testimony of 1\:uelme.
People v. Thurmond, supra.
While it is true that witness Harvey saw a person
running from the scene of the shooting wearing a threequarter length, light colored coat ending above or at the
break of the knees (R. 986), he described the person as
5'6" to 5'10", a burley man with dark hair, heavy set and
running very agilely (R. 988), without a limp or deformities. ·The defendant is 5'372" with her shoes on,
weighs 130 pounds, has grayish brown hair and a physical infirmity in the legs and buttocks. The State made no
attempt to have Harvey identify Miss Sinclair as the
person at the scene.
Witness Williarns also testified to seeing in a rear
view mirror a man in a light short coat coming between
the knees and crotch. He couldn't identify the type of
coat. The person had a cleft chin, long nose, hair on
the darker side, and was seen at the north end of the
Susan Kay Apartments at about 12 :25 a.m. January 5th.
He stated certain features resembled l\Iiss Sinclair but
could not point them out on cross examination when
confronted by the defendant. The witness : "Vvould you
please turn to the side. I see there isn't any S curve or
cleft chin as pronounced" (R. 982). The State again
made no effort to identify the defendant as the person
seen by the witness.
During the trial there were several light colored
trench coats hanging on the coat racks which were
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pointed out by the prosecutor for type and comparison.
Ther~

is also testinwny that Yaughn llumphreys has a
faYln colored thrt>t>·quarter length trench coat, and th.at
Billie Rawlins has such a coat. The cleaner identified the
eoat in his establish1nent as a full length overcoat. The
8ta.te, other than inference, n1ade no attempt to clailn
the eoat at the cleaners was the same coat that was seen
by either "\Villiams or .Harvey at the scene of the crime.
'Vithout inference or interpretation from the testi.
mony of K~uehne, the defendant's taking a coat to the
c.leaners on January 5th is consistent with innocence.
It should also be noted that the articles were taken to
her regular cleaners and not to a self.service eleaners
or a strange establishment, and were not picked up for
~PvPral days.
Again, State v. Baum, supra, cites the Utah law on
the present fact situation set forth above, eighteen beer
bottles similar to those stolen in the Baum case were
found in the defendant's house. The Court states at
page ;>19:
.. \Ye think the corroboration insufficient to
connect the defendant with the offense of burglary, the offense with which he was charged
and convicted. The empty bottles found in his
house were not even shown to have been taken
from the cellar."
State r. Gardner, 83 Utah 145, 27 P. 2d. 51, gives a
t borough discussion of the tests of sufficiency of corroboration in this State, and cites from thirty Utah
cases therein. People r. Thurmond, supra, a late CaliSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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fornia case, discusses in detail all the State'::; claims for
corroboration, pointing out in each instance that tlH·
contention without inference or interpretation from the
testimony of an accomplice does no nwre than ereate
a suspicion when related to acts with which the defendant
was charged. In that case, defendant was convicted of
twenty separate charges of perversion under Californi'a
Penal Code 288(a), and undoubtedly as did this Statt~·~
contention of a Lesbian relationship in the case on appeal, caused the jury to ignore the insufficiency of the
evidence and convict on a basis of prejudice arising from
what they considered to be unnatural and abhorrent.
The Baum case cited above has not been overruled in
this jurisdiction.
There is not a scintilla of evidence to corroborate
Kuehne's testimony, and on the other hand, four witnesses testified to the presence of the defendant in her
h01ne some miles from the scene of the crime both at
the time the crime was committed and during the period
when Kuehne insists that she was at his apartment some
thirty blocks away. See the testimony of :Jlildred Sinclair, Lamond Sinclair, Ellen Rawlins, and Bessie Anderson. Even State's witnesses Reva Nelson and Thelma
Eatche1l, used in rebuttal to impeach the alibi, tend to
bear out defendant's presence at the rest home. \Vitness
Nelson saw her there at 8:20p.m. when :Jiildred Hinclair
was warming pizza for Jean Sinclair (R. 1656), while
Kuehne claims she was at his apartment fr01n 8:30 to
11 :00 p.m. Thelma Eatchel says she ~aw her when coming down the stairs at 1 :20 a.m. January 5th to get the
first of two shots for patients Austin and Harris. The
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nan·oti<· logs in PvidPIH'P show hy what witness Eatchell
:mvs was h<'r handwriting that the second of the two

:-;hots, that given to
at l :00 a.m.

~lae

Austin, w.as recorded as given

Th<· evidence that the State contends corroborates
Kuehne's testimony in eaeh case is consistent with the
innoePill'l' of defendant and can do no more than cast
a ~uspicion on the accused. The well settled law is
thnt thi~ is not sufficient. The Court should reven;e
nnd order the defendant discharged.
POINT V
THE COURT WAS IN ERROR IN REFUSING TO GRANT
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL.

After verdiet and prior to judgment, defendant made
timely motion for new trial (R. 109-110) with supporting
affidavits (R. 11:2 through 120) based on (a) three instances of jury 1nisconduct, (b) the errors of the Court
heretofore discussed as Points 1, :2, 3 and 4, and (c)
newly discovered evidence.
The Court, after considering affidavits and counter
affidavits and hearing arguments on the law, denied the
motion.
The instances of jury misconduct were as follows:
(a) Richard Dibblee, the County Attorney who
handled the prelhninary hearing, admittedly shook hands
\\ith an alternate juror in the hall outside the courtroom
and had a conversation with him. The affidavits (R.
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112) and counter affidavits (R. 122-123) differ as to
whether other jurors were present.
(h) Juror No. 12, Riley, talked with a spectator on
three different dates during the trial and provided her
with .autographs and addresses of all twelve jurors prior
to deliberation (R. 113-115). l-Ie also discussed the trial
with her (R. 113 and 123).
(c) Juror No. 10, A. A. Firmage, who was later
foreman .of the jury, approached, shook hands, and had
.a conversation with State's witness Gerritadina Combee
as she was stepping from the witness stand at a reoess.
This took place before the rest of the jury and the entire Oourt. This matter was immediately called to the
attention of the Court.
The instances set forth in (a) and (b) above were
unknown to the defense counsel until after the trial.
This Court stated in State v. Ander.son, 65 Utah 415;
237 P. 941:
"The authorities, however, all agreed that
any conduct or relationship between a juror and
.a party to an action during trial would or might
consciously or unconsciously tend to influence the
judgment of the juror authorizes and requires
the granting of a new trial unless it is made to
appear affirmatively that the judgment of the
juror was in no way .affected by such relationship
or that the parties by their conduct waived their
right to make objection to such conduct ... but
it should also be remembered that when a juror
is selected by reason of his impartiality to deSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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termin~·.

not only property rights between individual:-; but in critninal ca~P~. involving lives and
pPt'8onal liberties of the individual charged with
offeJt~P~, the law n•quires of tlw juror such condud during that tinw that his verdict may be
ahm:p sw.;picion a:-; to its having been influenced
hy <lit~· <·onduct on his part during the trial. ... "

'fhe Court then reviews authorities.
In State v. ()rank, a L'"tah hmnicide case, 142 P. 2d
liS. approving the Anderson case, this Court stated:
''In the case at the bar Ashcroft too was the
prosecution's witness and had taken a prominent
part in the trial of the case .... The conversation
in question took plaee as alleged in counter affidavits in open court almost within hearing of the
defendants and their counsel and affidavits of
both the juror and the witness are to the effect
that they were not discussing the case but merely
talking in a friendly fashion. In spite of these
extenuating circu1nstances this oonduct is eertainly improper and is to be condemned by the
Court, particularly in capital eases where the life
or liberty of the defendant is at stake. In such
instances the verdict of the jury, like Caesar's
wife, must be above suspicion. In the instant case,
~in<_>e a new trial 1nust be granted on other
grounds, we need not deter1nine whether such
conduct would alone be grounds for a new trial."
(Emphasis the Court's.)
.Also see State r. Th.orne, 39 l'"tah 208, 117 P. 58, at
page 66, and cases cited therein.

It is noted that the factual situation in State L
Crank Is so similar to the Firmage-Gombee situation
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in this case as to be ahnost indistinguishahh'. The ('a~r:-;
are both capital cases; the juror shook hands with and
conversed with the State's witness before the rest of the
jury, the Court, and counsel. In both instances, affidavit~
of the principals would indicate the case "·as not di~
cussed. However, in State L'. Crank, the Court held the
conduct to be improper and refrained from rulill~
whether this conduct alone would be grounds for reversal
only because the case was alr·ead:· being reversed on
other grounds. It would seem that in the case on appeal,
there are three distinct instances equally as adverse to
jury impartiality as in the Crank case, supra, and involving three different jurors; one, the ultimate foreman
of the jury, before the rest of the jury and the entire
Court; another, an alternate juror in contact with the
prosecuting official who had been responsible for the
case through preliminary hearing; and the third, through
his conduct involving all men1bers of the jury by procuring their signatures and addresses to furnish a spectator who was purportedly going to write a boo!k about
the trial. The mere procuring of the signatures would
create a necessary inference that he had discussed with
the other jurors his conversations with the spectator in
order to give a reason for requiring their signatures
and addresses and in some instances phone numbers (see
R. 114-115).
There is no way to determine whether these instances or any of them might have consciously or unconsciously influenced one or more jurors, State v.
Anderson, supra. The burden is on the State to affirmatively show an absence of any such effect. State v.
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.lnderson and Staff' 1'. Cra11k, :-;upra. It would seem that
any of the thn•e in~tances alone would be grounds for
a new trial and tlw combination of thP three in a capital
t·a:-:P should mal<e a reversal imperative.

POINT VI
THE COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING PREJUDICIAL
HEARSAY STATEMENTS IN EVIDENCE OVER PROPER
OBJECTION.

In five in:-;tanee~ the Court allowed the District
.\ttornl'Y to go into conversations between a witness and
a third party, S"aid conversations taking place out of the
presence of the defendant being immaterial and incompetent and not under any exception to the hearsa~' rule.
(a) Vaughn Humphreys was allowed to testify to
the context of a conversation between he and Carl
Kuehne regarding a plot to kill Don LeRoy Foster (R.
7-ll-1-t-~). Both Kuehne and Humphreys were State's
witnPsses. The eonversation would appear to a jury to
corroborate Kuehne's testimony, though the universal
rule is that an accomplice eannot eorroborate himself.

{b) L.aRae l(uehne on rebuttal was allowed, over
objection, to testify to a eonversation between she and
~Iildred Sinclair out of the presenee of the defendant (R.
163:!-1634). The effect of the testimony was to impair
the defendant's alibi, but was not impeaehing evidence as
to ~Iildred Sinel.air as she had not been questioned re~aniing the conversation (R. 1634). The Court denied
defendant's n1otion to strike and to admonish the jury.
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(c) The Court allowed private detective B. 11..,. RoInano to relate a conversation between he and ~rhayle
Olsen not in the presence of the defendant (R. 1637-1639)
over objection by the defendant. The conversation related to hiring a detective to follow LaRae Peterson and
Don Foster and is not shown to have been "·ithin the
knowledge of the defendant.
(d) Beth Foster, wife of the deceased, was allowed
to relate two purported conversations with Thayle OlseH
(R. 1638-1651), neither conversation being in the presence of the defendant. Both conversations related to the
Foster-Peterson relationship. The second conversation
contained the following statement by witness Beth
Foster:
"She told me that Jean Sinclair was an expert marksman, that there had been a shooting
three or four years ago in :Magna. I :know nothing
of it. This is all she said, in which Jean Sinclair
had been mixed up. She said I could not underestimate her. She usually gets what she goes out
for, and she says Don is in danger unless you
stop it" (R. 1650).
(e) Reva Nelson was allowed to relate a conversation with Ellen Rawlins out of the presence of defendant
and over objections (R. 1659-1660).
Each conversation was hearsay and incornpetent,
and each extremely prejudicial to the defendant, especially so Mrs. Foster's hearsay statement regarding the
defendant being involved in a shooting in :Magna three
or four years ago.
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Attornpy rlaimed that the conversation~
go to impeaclnnent of the various witnesses. However,
in (a) above, both witnP~~p:-; wPre the State's witnesses,
and in the ('a~t-:-; of ('b), (c), and ( P) a careful search of
thP record shows that the conversations were not gone
into or mentioned in the testimony of the witnesses purportedly impeached, and in (d) above Thayle Olsen admittP(l to conversations with ~frs. Beth Foster but the
substance of the conversation was not pursued, nor
Wlntld it have been Inaterial or competent had it been
pursued. ~l r::;. Foster's relations of the text of the eonn~rsations could only prejudice the defendant and did
not impearh witness Olsen.
'rlw

l>i~trid

\Varren on Homicide, Permanent Ed., Vol. 4, page
f>n7. sets out the rule regarding prejudicial admissions
of t>vidence :
··It is a well established fact that error in
admitting illegal evidence on a trial for homicide
where plainly without prejudice to the accused is
not grounds for reversal. If, however, the accused
may lw ce been prejudiced by improper evidence,
even though it be doubtful whether he was or not,
that will be grounds for reversing a judgn1ent."
(~Jmphasis added)

Here, the text cites some fifty cases including State v.
Thorne, 39 Utah 208, 117 P. 58.
Citing 'Varren, supra, at page 589:
"It is sufficient to authorize reversal if the
testimony erroneously admitted tended or was
calculated to injure the defendant with the jury."
Again citing State L". Thorne, supra.
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Each conversation is hean;ay, incompetent and
highly prejudicial to the defendant and should require
a reversal. Can it be said that in any one of the five
instances, the conversation was not "calculated to injure
the defendant with the jury"~
POINT VII
THE COURT ERRED IN GIVING INSTRUCTIONS NO.
9 AND 10 AND REFUSING DEFENDANT'S REQUESTED
INSTRUCTIONS NO. 2, 3 AND 4.

The Court erred in giving Instructions No. 9 and
10 for the reasons set forth in Point III, that under the
factual set up of this case the question of accomplicity
of Carl Kuehne is a question of law for the Court. The
Court, after denying defendant's Motion for a directed
verdict should have ruled that Kuehne was an accomplice
as a matter of law and given proper instructions on corroborative evidence; or ruled as a matter of law that
Kuehne was not an accomplice and refrained from giving
instructions on corroboration. State v. Ripley, supra,
with annotations at 19 A.L.R. 1355.
Further, the two instructions as given are not the
law, fail to set forth adequately what constitutes an accomplice and are confusing to the jury.
The Court, in using the State's requested instruction as the Court's Instruction K o. 9 in paragraph 3
there-of, uses the words "knowingly and with criminal
intent aid or abet or having advised and encouraged the
commission of the act charged," then in paragraph -1
70
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uses the :-;ntne words ••knowingly and with cri1ninal intl•nt'' in an at tempt tP define aid and ahet. r:rhe Court
then negativt>~ any t>fi'Pet of Instruction i\o. 9 by stating
in Instruction ~ o. 10 "that 1nerely aiding and assisting
in the t·onuni:-;:;ion of a crilne without guilty knowledge
or intent is not eriminal and the person aiding or assisting without guilty knowledge or intent is not an accomplice." ~rhe Court nowhere defines knowingly, guilty
kno\riPdgl', or criininal intent.
The Court in Instruction No. 12 (R. -±4) defines intent and ~1weific intent, neither of which has the san1e
meaning as criminal intent.
.. \Vhere a technical tenn or terms which have
aequired particular significance in the law are en111loyPd in instructions, the Court should point out
the meaning to the jury unless the 1neaning is
already elPar." Reid's Branson Instructions to
Judes, Yol. 1, p. 174.

It was the duty of the Court in this case to define
to the jury knowingly, crilninal intent, and guilty knowledge. Abo, it was error for the Court to combine the
words ''knowingly and with criminal intent" where either
guilty lrnowledge or criminal intent are sufficient alone,
the criminal intent being inferred fro1n the guilty knowledge. Pnder the evidence in this case Carl l{uehne, front
hi~ own testimony, knew the purpose of Jean Sinclair
when he did the acts to which he testified at the trial.
.\~ pointed out \\ith repetition in the Staten1ent of Fa0ts,
he gave a false name when buying the gun and sheUs
because Jean had been threatening to kill Foster. He
knew .. it was her avowed purpose to kill Foster" (R. 716).
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He unloaded the shells before the crin1e because she said
she only needed one. He went with her to the various
places to advise her where would be the best place to
kill Foster. Kuehne had guilty knowledge and the failure
to define the terms guilty knowledge, knowingly and
criminal intent was error. It has been held error not to
define "knowingly," Reid's Branson Instruct<ions to
Juries, Vol. 1, p. 175, citing People v. Stewart, 68 Cal.
App. 621, 230 P. 221. Failure to define aiding and
abetting is error. Same citation as above.
The Court attempts in Instruction No. 9 to define
aid and a;bet, but merely reverses the use of the words
"knowingly and with criminal intent" in Paragraph 3
of the same instruction defining accomplice. The Court,
by its failure to define these terms and by using knowingly and with criminal intent in the disjunctive in Instruction No. 9 and in the conjunctive in Instruction No.
10, could have no effect but to confuse the jury.
With regard to the question of intent, there is also
case law to the effect that criminal intent is presumed.
The defendant in criminal prosecutions is presumed to
intend the ordinary results of his voluntary acts. State
v. Owen, 119 Ore. 15, 244 P. 560. The slightest degree of
assistance or collusion is sufficient. Comm. v. Lowry,
374 Pa. 594, 98 Atlantic 2d 733, Cert. Den. 347 U.S. 914,
98 L. Ed. 1017, 74 S. Ct. 479. It is immaterial whether
the aider and abettor has any direct or personal interest
in the results of the crime or whether he· will gain in
any way thereby U.S. v. llfoss, 122 F. Sup. 523, Rev. on
other grounds, C A. 3d, 220 F 2d 166.
72
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If one person a~~isted anotlwr in doing a criminal
ad, it is prt>~umed he shared the intent wjth \\·hich the
pt>r~on w~ doing the act. H"lwrfou's Cri111ioal El:ideilce,
1~th J1~d., \" ol. 1, p. :2-!(i. If a person advising or eounsel ..
ing the crime changes his 1nind he is still liable as an
U.C.'('P~~ory if ht- does not inforn1 the principal of his
changed desires. Stat(' v. Allen, -!7 Conn. 121, Wharton's
C. L. & P., 1:2th Ed. 2:~9.

•·Jn order to be an accessory before the fact
it i:-; neeessary that the actor know that he is
taking a step to pronwte the commission of a
erimP. It is not necessary that the accomplice
before the fad have full knowledge of all the details of the criminal plan or the identity of all
persons participating therein. It is not necessary
that the defendant should have originated the de:-;ign of com1nitting the offense if the principal
had previously fanned the design, and the alleged
accomplice encouraged hiin to carry it out by
falsehood or otherwise, he is guilty as an acces:;ory before the fact." \Yharton's 12th Ed. citing
Keeleher L'. State, 10 Smedes & M (niiss.) 192.
The ~tate contends that l(uehne had withdrawn
prior to the killing. However, the evidence shows that
immediately before she left to "kill myself a son-of-abitch" he sawed off the gun, unloaded the shells, and
showed her how to load the gun and put it on safety, and
expressed not the least surprise when she came back
and told hin1 to dispose of the weapon and shells.
The Court in Instruction ~ o. 9 fails to set forth that
an aooompliee is a prineipal and that an aidor and abettor
need not be present at the scene of the crime. See 76Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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1--±-L This in conjunction with the Court's instruction t'Pgarding alibi and the Court's failure to define guilty
knowledge and criminal intent is further confusing to
the jury. The evidence shows that Kuehne was an aecomplice. He had guilty knowledge of the purpose of the
acts he did allegedly at the request of Jean Sinclair. I I(·
aided and abetted and became an accessory to the killing
of Don Foster. The Court by giving its Instructions No.
9 and 10, and refusal to give defandant's requested Instructions No. 2, 3 and 4, left the jury in a state of confusion .as to the necessity of corroborative evidence.

POINT VIII
THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO GIVE DEFENDANT'S INSTRUCTIONS NO. 6, NO. 17, NO. 20.

It was the defendant's contention and theory in the
alternative from the opening state1nent on, that there
was more evidence to connect Carl Kuehne to the killing
of Don Foster than there was the defendant, and that
l{uehne had no alibi. Secondly, that Carl Kuehne
was an .accomplice to the killing of Don Fo~tPr and his
testimony should be viewed with distrust and must be
corroborated. r:rhe Court, by its deletions of the last
paragraph of the requested Instruction K o. 6, and the
first paragraph of Instruction No. 20, failed to present
to the jury the defendant's theory of the case. The
rule in Civil cases requiring the Court to instruct on
all theories of the case having supported in evidence
to any extent, has a like application in criminal prosecutions. See Reid's Branson Instructions to Juries, Yol.
74
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l., St·d i()n ;):;, p. 170. ThP a.<·<·u:.;ed

i~

entitled to have
the jury in:.;truct('<l on the whole law of the case. See
.lunnlatiuu of Ucid's /Jransou rol. 1, p. 170, Note 57.

It

i~

error for a trial court to fail to give equal
~h·(·~~ to tlw <·ontentions of the State and the defendant.
'fhi~ doe~ not necessarily mean that the staternents of
the opposing parties be of equal length, but there is a
lnek of Pqnal ~trP~~ when the State's contentions are given
at great length and detail while, on the other hand,
tlw dPI'Pndanfs contentions are given in very brief genPral tpnn~ a:-; though he had offered no evidence at all.
Hl'ifi's Branson, lrol. 1, p. 172. The court may instruct
upon all tlworieH of the defense though they may necP~~arily conflict. The instruction should be given though
the evidence in support of the theory is slight. The in~truction ~hould cover contentions made and argued
before the jury and the theory rnust be presented pertint~ntly, plainly, and affirmatively.
\\~here the accused in his statement presents a
theory. which if true, entitles him either to acquittal or
convietion of a lower offense than the one charged, it
i~ error to refuse a written request applicable to such
theory. Di:icr r. State, 12 Ga. App. 722, 78 S. E. 203.
The Court by striking the first portion of defendant's
requested Instruction K o. :20 and failing to instruct as
reque~ted Instruction No. 17, that the defendant's theory
\ra~ that Cnrll\::uehne was an accomplice* has eliminated
from the instructions any clear statement of the defend-

*The Court in Instruction No. 17 has endorsed the instruction

g-iven in substance. This is not the fact.
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ant's theory. The only place Carl Kuehne's name is even
mentioned in the instructions is in the remaining portion
of defendant's requested Instruction No. 20, the Court's
given Instruction No. 19 which makes Court's Instruction
No. 19 incomplete and leaves a total failure of instructions as a whole to set out the defendant's theory of the
case. This error compounds the errors heretofore discussed in Point VII as the Court instructs incompletely
as to accomplices and aiding and abetting but refuses to
instruct as to the defendant's theory that I{uehne was an
accomplice. The Court gives various instructions on requirements of corroboration, but by its deletions of defendant's requested instruction No. 6 and No. 20, and
failure to set forth Carl Kuehne at any point as the
claimed accomplice, leaves Instructions No. 9 and No. 10
and the various instructions on corroborating, literally
hanging in the air. It should be remembered that there
are sixty-four (64) witnesses in the case on appeal.
It should further be noted that the Court granted as
written, all requests set forth by the State.

POINT IX
THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING DEF'ENDANT'S
REQUESTED INSTRUCTION NO. 30.

The State's theory as set forth in the Court's instructions was that Jean Sinclair n1urdered Don LeRoy
Foster; not that she conspired with another or was
a principal, was an accomplice or an accessory before
the fact to the homicide. The defendant's requested
76
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instruction ~ o. 30 prohi hi ted the jury frmn convicting
Miss Sinclair unless tlwy found th.at she fired the shot
that killed I>on Foster. There is no evidence of nor
i:-; there any claim by the State that !\Liss Sinclair aided,
abetted, was a conspirator or an accomplice. There was
also no evidence that i\Liss Sinclair was at or near
the ~eene of the cri1ne at the time that it happened,
and the evidence by Carl Kuehne was such that the
jury could well have believed she conspired with him
or he and others to commit the murder. "Where the
indictment• charges that the defendant alone committed
the offense, it is error to instn1ct the jury that conviction
i:-; authorized if the accused aided and abetted the commission of the crime," Till1nan v. Commonwealth, 259
Ky. ~~~' 82 SW2d 222. "Where the defendant is charged
as a principal, the instructions should point out clearly
what acts or conduct constitutes defendant a principal,"
I·J'!li::;o·n v. Commonwealth, 130 Ya. 738, 107 SE 689.
The Court's instruction No. 9 and 10, heretofore
discussed in Point VII with regard to accomplice, could
well have confused the jury in their interpretation of
Xo. 8, especially as the Court refused to instruct on
the defendant's theory as to who the claimed accomplice
was.
POINT X
THE COURT ERRED IN SUSTAINING STATE'S OBJECTIONS TO COUNSEL'S QUESTIONS AS TO WHY CARL
Kl'EHNE HAD NOT BEEN ARRESTED OR CHARGED.
*In this case, the information
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After laying the foundation as to knowledge of the
statements of Carl Kuehne b~· Richard Dibblee, Chief
Criminal Deputy, Salt Lake County Attonw~··~ Office,
defense· counsel asked :
"Why didn't you have a complaint filed
against ~Ir. Kuehne, :Jir. Dibblee '!"
t.Ir. Banks: "I'll object to that, your Honor,
it's immaterial."
Mr. Hatch: "I don't think it's immaterial
after the foundation we've laid."
Mr. Banks: "I think it is. That's an entirely
separate affair." (R. 1591).
After arguments thereon the Court sustained the
objection (R. 1592). The question n1ust be material as
the defense's theory in the opening statement and
through the entire trial was that Carl 1-\::uehne, h)· his
own statements and production of evidence, had implicated himself in the murder of Don Foster, had no
alibi, and was a more likely suspect for the killing than
the defendant. ·The evidence shows that the police had
discussed with Kuehne a pardon for a previous crime,
after which he gave them statements sufficient to warrant a complaint against him for first degree murder
as a principal, and facts sufficient for a conviction of
being an accessory after the fact. There has been no
charge or arrest. The only logical reason for not charging Kuehne for one crime or both would be that upon
his refusal to testify there would be no evidence whatsoever against the defendant Jean Sinclair. Further. the
statements given by l(uehne would not hold up as a
78
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eonfp;.;:-~ion a~ainst

hiinself, due to the nwtlwds of obtaining thP :-~tatement~, including faihirP to advise hin1 of
his eon:-~titutional rights, the thinly veiled promise of help
with a pardon, and holding hin1 incommunicado without
\'hlll'g"P.

rrhe matter wa:-; opened first by the District Attorm•y when he asked J(uehne \vhy he refused to testify
(H. 698-699). Defense counsel followed up the matter
on cross examination where the witness stated "that
he belit•\·ed that the County Attorney was acting as my
attorney" (R. 713).
'l'lw question was highly 1naterial for two reasons;

one, with regard to the question of whether or not
Kuehn<' was chargeable \vith the crime and therefore a
principal and an ac-cessory before the fact. vVitness
Dibblee was the prosecutor who had authorized the complaint against the defendant solely on Kuehne's statemenb_,, The Court itself e1nphasized the nmteriality of
this question in instruction No. 9, second paragraph, as
follows:
"An accomplice is one who is liable to prosecution for the identical offense charged against
the defendant on trial" ( R. 40).

It i~ apparent that the question of why Kuehne was not
charged was material to the defense's theory of accomplicity of Kuehne. Secondly, the question is 1naterial
in laying a foundation for proper impeachment of
Kuehne on the basis of promises not to charge hin1 if
he testified or threats to issue a con1plaint if he refused
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to testify. True, K.uelme denied threats or promi~e~,
but the examination by the District Attorney at R. 698699 and the cross examination at R. 713 show~ not only
evidence of promises not to prosecute but an indication
that either the police or one of the prosecuting official~
had informed him that the County Attorne~· was acting
as his attorney.
This ties in directly with J(uehne's late effort to
invoke privilege arising from self-incrimination to qn<'l'tions regarding the shot gun and shells.
Witness Dibblee was the person having authority to
issue a criminal complaint, and the reason he did not
authorize such a complaint is 1naterial to the defense's
theory and was not incompetent for any reason.
POINT XI
THE COURT ERRED TO THE PREJUDICE OF THE
DEFENDANT IN COMPELLING CARL KUEHNE TO TESTIFY OVER CLAIM OF PRIVILEGE.

Carl Kuehne refused to answer questions regarding
the purchase of a shot gun for Jean Sinclair on the basiH
that the answer might tend to incriminatP him. The
Court, after argument, compelled the witness to testify.
Apparently upon the reasoning set forth by :.\lr. Banks:
"Your Honor, I will invite the Court's attention to the preliminary hearing transcript which
vou have read and this defendant has waived
~ny iminunity he might have by reason of that,
in 1ny opinion, and request the Court to compel
hiln to answer." (R. 569).
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Tlw Court eompelled thP an~wer (H. 370).

rehe Court: "lt'H the finding of the Court,
KtwhnP, that you 1nu~t answer all questions
involved.''
~lr.

The \\'itnes8: HAll questions in regard to
this f"
1

The ( 0Urt: "That's correct."
Wltt>t'eupon, defense counsel requested an objection to
each qtw~tion involving the shot gun (R. 570).
1'he witness Kuehne endeavored again and again
to refuse to answer questions regarding the shot gun,

the ~hell~, the purchase of them, giving thmn to lVIiss
Sinclair, and disposal of the gun and shells. The Court
was in error in requiring the witness to testify after
Itt> <'laimed his privilege. There is no argument that
the privilege is personal to the witness. However, the
witne~s claimed the privilege and was compelled to
answer by the Court. There can be no doubt that any
question with regard to the shot gun and shells would
or might tend to incrilninate Kuehne either for the
erime of murder in the first degree or as being an
aeet>s~ory after the fact. The, law is clear that the privilege attaches to each hearing and the fact that a witness
testified at a coroner's hearing, before a grand jury,
or at a preliminary hearing of the instant trial, or to
tl1e 8ame facts in another case, does not constitute a
waiver of the privilege when claimed by him. See State
r. A.Uiso·n, 116 Jlont. 352, 153 P.2d 141; Ex parte Sales, a
California case, ~4 P. 2d 916; Ot·erand v. Superior Court,
131 Cal. 280, 63 P. 372; In rc Berman, 105 Cal. App. 37,
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287 P. 126; also under Hill's Crin1inal Evidence, Vol.
Section 358.

~'

That the testinwny was prejudicial to the defendant
1s too clear to require argument. Without l(uehne'~
testimony regarding procuring of the gun and shells,
alteration of the gun and shells, delivery to her of the
gun and one shell, and disposal of the gun and shells,
there would be no case at all against l\1iss Sinclair. While
it is true that the privilege is personal and cannot be
claimed by the defendant in lieu of the witness, the
witness did claim the privilege and was improperly
cmnpeUed to testify. !The testimony is involuntary and
under cmnpulsion of the Court. There can he no question
that the witness was entitled to the privilege. The Court
could not have found that the testimony did not or might
not, or the answers did not or might not, tend to incriminate Kuehne. See United States v. Burr (In re Willie),
25 Federal cases, page 38, No. 14692E, where Chief
Justice Marshall lays down the rules with regard to
the nature of the self-incrimination. If the Court hatl
not erroneously compelled this testimony, there could
have been no conviction.
Professor vVigmore discusses this question and
seems to advocate that only the witness can object to
compelled testimony, and that the party should not be
so allowed. However, he points out that the majority
of Oourts allow a party to take exception under what
he calls the "sporting rule," see 8 Wigmore on Evidence,
3rd Ed. 2196. Commonwealth v. Kimball, Mass. 24, Peck
366 and 368, allows objection by a party and bases a
82
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rpvpn;al thereon

u:-;iu~

thP following language:

"l t could not be held that the verdict was
~upportt>d

by legal evidence.''

Cummuntcealth u. 8/wu:, 4 Cush. 594, approves Commonwealth v. K.imball. State v. Ulill, ~:3 Wis. 309, at page
31H discussing the question, states: '"It seems that a
party may appeal." This Court in State v. Cox, 277
P. 97~, at page 973 under a claiin of error fr01n compelled
testimony of an accon1plice, refuses to discuss the question on Uw basis that the witness was not compelled
to answer any particular questions over his objection
on the ground of privilege.
This i~ but another example of the .apparent prejudiee of the Court in its ruling throughout the trial
with regard to admission and exclusion of evidence
(:-;pp Point YI).
LaRae Peterson was compelled to take a contempt
rather than answer the incriminating question.
POINT XII
THE DEFENDANT'S TRIAL AND CONVICTION WERE
UNCONSTITUTIONAL UNDER THE FIFTH AMENDMENT
TO THE CONSTITUTION 0 F THE UNITED STATES.

The Fifth Amendn1ent of the United States Constitution provides among other privileges and immunities
to the person as follows :
"No person shall be held to answer for a
captital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on
a presentment or indicbnent of a Grand Jury."
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The Fourteenth ...t\.mendment provide:-; that :
"All persons born or naturalized in the
United States, and subject to the jurisdiction
thereof, are citizens of the 17nited States and of
the State wherein they reside. X o State shall
Inake or enforce any law which shall abridge
the privileges and irmnunities of citizens of the
United States.
The Supreme Court of the United States in the
case of Mapp v. Ohio, 6 L. Ed. 2d 1081, holds that the
right of security of a person under the Fourth Amendment makes an unreasonable search and seizure unconstitutional when applying the Fourteenth Amendment
guaranteeing the privileges and immunities of citizens
of the United States, Justice Black in concurring therein
points out that the rights granted under the F~urh and
Fifth Amendments are part of the privilege~ and immunities guaranteed by the Fourteenth Ar.aendment. The
l\fapp case, supra, reversed the stand the Court had
taken some 34 years before with relation to the Fourth
and Fifth Amendments of the United States Constitution
applying to State Courts.
The same reasoning used In the Mapp ease as to
unreasonable search and seizure is applicable to cases
arising under the guarantee of the privileges and immunities set forth in Fifth Amendment. In mruking the
above argument the writer is aware of the case of
I-Iurtailo v. Cal·ifornia. 110 U.S. 516, where the defendant
claimed that his homicide conviction was unconstitutional
on the same basis as the claim here made. However,
the case of Mapp v. Ohio, supra, would appear to reverse
84 provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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the Hurtado case by implication without expressly doing
~0.

Jean Sinclair was proceeded against by cornplaint
(R. 3) and infonnation (R. 10) in a prosecution for
murder in the first degree, a capital case (76-30-3 and
7(i-~m--t-, ecA 1953). The l~tah Constitution, Article 1,
~t-d ion :~ ~tates as follows:
"The State of Utah is an inseparable part
of th<> federal union and the Constitution of the
Fnih•d Htah•s is the supreme law of the land."
lTtah Constitution, Article 1, Section 7:
•· K o person shall be deprived of life, liberty
or property without due process of law."

Utah Constitution, Article 1, Section 13, provides for
prosecutions by infonnation, or indictment in the alternative.
The ca~e of In re illcf{ee, 57 P. 23, 19 Utah 231,
is informative on the subject, as is JJf axwell v. Dowell,
17H r.S. 581, -1-J. Ed. 597, 20 Supreme Court -1-18, with
Justice Harlan dissenting, affinning 19 Utah 495, 57
P. -112. That case holds that the liberties and immunities
gu.aranteeed by the Fourteenth Amendment are not
violated by Section 10, Article I of the Utah State Constitution in its application to the Sixth Amendment to
the United States Constitution. However, it should be
observed that Amendment YI is a general guarantee
of speedy trial by impartial jury, and requires that
defendant be informed of the nature and cause of the
nrru8ation, to be confronted by witnesses, to have comSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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pulsory process for obtaining witnesses, and to have the
assistance of counsel. On the other hand, Amendment
V provides that no person shall be held to am:;\\'('1'
for a capital crime unless on presentment or indictment,
and allowing prosecution of a capital crime h.v information is a distinct violation and abridgement of one of the
privileges and immunities guaranteed by the Fourteenth
Amendment.
The Maxwell case, supra, rules on the question of
prosecution of a non-capital felony by information, which
is nowhe·re prohibited by the Constitution of the United
States.

POINT XIII
THE COURT, AFTER ERRONEOUSLY COMPELLING
LaRAE PETERSON TO 'TESTIFY, OVER CLAIM OF PRIVILEGE AND COMPELLING AN ANSWER WHICH SHE REFUSED TO GIVE, FAILED TO ADMONISH THE JURY
THAT NO INFERENCE OF WHAT THE ANSWER WAS
OR MIGHT HAVE BEEN, CAN BE DRAWN FROM THE
REFUSAL TO ANSWER, AND THE DISTRICT ATTORNEY
COMPOUNDED THE ERROR BY ARGUING THE MATTER
IN HIS SUMMATION.

The Court compelled LaRae Peterson to answer
an improper question over proper objection.
Mr. Banks: "I'll ask you if you or Jean have
ever committed any Lesbian acts with each other."
Mr. Hatch: "Objected to as ambiguous."
Mr. ~iitsanaga: "Also may the record show
counsel does invoke the privilege pursuant to 70

86
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Ftuh Code m rPI't•rence to ~lr. Bank:.;' qm·~tion''
~It 4~7).

'!'hereafter, on voir dire exan1ination, ~Lrs. Peterson
ndmittPd she did not know whether it was possible for
two women to have sexual relations with one another,
nnd that she did not know what Lesbian acts were. The
l'ourt indicated that the objection was well taken as
being ambiguous at R. 783, the Court: ''I think to an
extent it might be, especially in the light of the fact
that it i~ difficult to dPfine, and that this witness does
not seem clear on what you n1ean by that teTIII, as used."
~,urther questions by ~lr. Banks: "Well, I'll put it this
way tlH'll, have you had any homosexual acts with .Jean
or Jean with you?" :Mr. Hatch: "Smne objection." Defpn:-;p counsel later added the objec1tion that the question
was immaterial. ~Irs. Peterson, on advice of counsel,
refused to an8wer the question, and the Court ordered
her to do so. The ·witness still refused (R. 788).
~li~~

Sinclair, when asked the same question, also
invoked the privilege. The Court did not admonish the
jury that they could not draw any inference fron1 the
rt>fu~ab to answer as to what the answer may have been.
~neh failure, even without request by counsel, is error.
··Refusal of a witness to answer questions
on the ground that answer 1nay tend to incriminate may not be used as a basis for inferring what
the answer may have been. . . . If the prosecution
knows when it puts the question that privilege
will be clain1ed, it is charged with notice of the
probable effect of the refusal on the jury's mind."
C.S. 1-:. Jl alone_, etal. :2G2 F 2d 535.
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ln the :Malone case the conviction was reversed
on the basis that the Court did not give an admonition
to the jury with regard to the creation of an inference
from the refusal to answer. It cmnments that the prosecutor is charged with the notice of the probable effect
of the refusal if he is aware that the refusal is coming.
U.S. v. Five Cases, Second Circuit, 179 F. 2d 519,
523, it was held that the District Attorney is charged
with notice of the probable effect of the refusal on the
jury's mind if he knew or had reasonable cause to know
that the answer would result in a claim of privilege,
and in U.S. v. O'Conner, Second Circuit, 237 ~_,. 2d 466
and 472, the Court held that failure of the Court to
admonish the jury resulted in reversible error although
the accused did not ask for such adn1onition or instruetion. This was done apparently on the theory as set forth
in U.S. v. 1'Ialone, supra, that the necessity of a request
of the defendant before the jury aggravated the possibility of an improper inference to the extent that it outweighed the admonition.

The U.S. Supren1e Court 1n J!.,Tamet v. the United
States, No. 134 October term 1962, published 11:ay 13,
1963, fully discusses and approves the reasoning in the
Malone case but differentiates that case from the Malone
case on the basis of the conduct of the District Attorney.
See also United States v. H·iss, 185 F. 2d 822, 823; United
States v. Amodio, 215 F. 2d 605, 614, Seventh Circuit.
In the case on appeal, the District Attorney wal'l
well aware that privilege would be claimed, especially as
to the question using the word "homosexual" as the
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matter had been thoroughly argued in ('hambers ( R. 78-±).
~lr. Ban:ks was on notice of the elaim of privilege and
still pursued the matter. As in the ~[alone case, supra,
the District Attorney co1npounded the error by ilnproper
arbrument in his suuunary, where he stated:
.. Now the <1uestion of hornosexuality has
nothing to do with this case and the Court has
instructed you only so far as it 1nay refer to
motive. We are not trying Jean Sinclair for
any rPlationship between LaRae Peterson and
herself, but it does come into this case, unfortunatPly, because it provides motive. \Vhat is motive
to kill t Through past experience, we have found
a great love, a great hate, to be sufficient. There
are great loves between women as there are between men. In fact, I think when this is found it
is probably a more jealous love. There is certainly
evidence in this case of a great jealousy. There
is no wrath like a woman's wrath." (R. 1877-1878).
The possible inferences fr01n the refusals to answer
are the only evidence of a homosexual relationship in
this ea~P, though there is inference through the entire
record that the State accused Jean Sinclair of being a
Lt>sbian. There are no other claims of "Lesbian acts or
homosexual acts," as used by the District Attorney 111
his questions to ~Irs. Peterson and ~Iiss Sinclair.
The District Attorney's argument was also highly
improper and prejudicial as there is no evidence in the
rase of the jealousy of loves between 1nan and 1nan,
man and woman, or woman and woman. His statement:
"There are great loves between women as there are
between men. In fact, I think when this is found it is
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probably a 1nore jealous love" is not supported by either
evidence or logic. It could only be calculated to inflame
a jury with regard to an inferred and unnatural sexual
relationship, of which there is no evidence.
This is reversible error.
POINT XIV
THE COURT ERRED IN OVERRULING DEFENDANT'S
OBJECTIONS TO QUESTIONS REGARDING LESBIAN
ACTS AND HOMOSEXUAL ACTS PUT TO LaRAE PETERSON AND TO THE DEFENDANT BY THE STATE.

The question set forth in Point XIII, supra, were
objected to by the counsel for the defendant as being
ambiguous and immaterial. As pointed out heretofore,
Mrs. Peterson admitted to voir dire she didn't know
what a "Lesbian act" was and did not know whether
there could be homosexual acts between women. "Lesbian" is defined as follows :
"1. Of or pertaining to Lesbos (now Mytilene), one of the Aegean Islands. 2. Erotic; in allusion to the reputed sensuality of the people
of Lesbos. 3. Of or pertaining to Lesbianism."
Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary, Second
Edition, 482.
None of the definitions connote an act or action. "Homosexual" as used in the question to ~Irs. Peterson:
"vVell, I'll put it this way then, have you had
any homosexual acts with Jean or Jean with
you~"

1s also ambiguous. \Yebster defines "homosexual" a:-~
follo-ws: "Eroticisn1 for one of the same sex.,. \Vhat
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a homosexual aet or a LP~hian act may be can differ
with w; many people a~ thl·re are different individuals.
'fhe quP~tions were not understood by either the witness
or the jury, gave an itnproper inferentl', and were inlmaterial. One has only to ask in •a group, "What is a
Lesbian act or what is a homosexual act" and it will
~·lieit as many different state1nents as there are people
in the group. If the District Attorney would ask the
:-\(H•eil'ie question with regard to kissing, fondling of
hrpa:-;t~, cunilingus, sodomy, or other acts having a common a~ well as legal Ineaning, the question would not
only have lost its ·ambiguity but would possibly have
avoided the elaims of privilege and the inferenee necessarily going to the jury as to what the answer might have
lwl;:'n. ~Pe U.~-_1...,'. l'. 1lfalone, s11pra.
POINT XV
THE COURT ERRED IN STRIKING THE ·woRD "DISTRUST" FROM DEFENDANT'S REQUESTED INSTRUCTION NO. 7 GIVING THAT SAME INSTRUCTION AS
COURT'S INSTRUCTION NO. 16 USING THE WORD "CAUTION" IN PLACE OF "DISTRUST."

The defendant, where there is a claimed accomplice
called by the people, is entitled to an instruction governing the jury's consideration of the accomplice's testimony
though he n1ade no request therefor. People v. ]}filler,
~Cal. Reporter 91, p. 105 citing cases. The cases without
variation, indicate that the requirement in the instruction is that the testilnony of an accomplice ought to be
viewed with distrust. The failure to give the latter in~trnetion, when an accomplice is called as a witness by
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the State, may constitute reversible error. Peo ]JI c r.
D~ail, 22 Cal. 2d 642, 653-656, 140 P. 2d 822, citing ca~(·~.
The words "caution" and "distrust" are not synonymous.
Caution connotes wariness or prudence in regard to
danger. Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary, 2d Ed.,
p. 132; while distrust is to feel no trust or confidence
in, to mistrust, or pointing out an active danger in the
testimony of an accomplice rather than merely a caution
to look for something wrong. Utah cases, without exception in discussing the question of acc01nplices, hold that
their testimony is to he viewed with distrust due to their
involvmnent in the matter concerned and the opportunity
to better their own position by testimony incriminating
to the person against whom they are testifying. Se<·
State v. Gardner, supra, citing cases. The defendant
was entitled to requested instruction No. 7 in its original
form and failure to give the same was prejudicial error.

POINT XVI
THE COURT ERRED IN RESTRICTING DEFENSE
COUNSEL'S CROSS EXAMINATION OF CARL KUEHNE.

The Court refused to let counsel cross examine Carl
Kuehne with respect to his prior convictions, although
the District Attorney had "opened the door" hy going
beyond the statutory questions in his dire·ct examination
(R. 110). He went into an escape frOin the penitentiary
fire-fighting detail (no felony charged), and a voluntary
giving himself up in Nevada, and into the question of
length of time served. The Court would not allow cross
exmnination by defense counsel on the subject (R. 694).
92
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'fhe Court n·ru~ed to h·t (•otm~el exrunine a~ to thP
p~ychintric baekgrounJ of Carl K.uehne (R. 698). Coun~t'l twuh· proffl•r:-; of proof with regard to both lines of
tP:'timony (H. 737 et :-;pq). Defendant wa~ prepared to
:-;ubmit p~y<'hiatric evidence as to K.uehne'::~ being a p::~y
t·lwpathie pt>rson.ality with schizophrenic tendencies
nt·at ing a compulsion to aet out in a violent manner
wlwn under stre:-;:-;, and casting doubt on his ability
to tell the tnlth. rrhe line of questioning went both
to hi~ credibility and cmnpetency and it was necessary
to lay u. foundation with Carl Kuehne for introduction of ·the psychiatric evidence to get around the
patient-physician privilege and to impeach Kuehne if
he denied the p~~·ehiatric evaluations and treatment.
'fhe District Attorney in questioning Kuehne with
regard to his previous felony conviction at R. 170 went
far beyond the scope of the allowable statutory questions regarding felony convictions. vV e do not attack
th:~ examination on the basis of in1proper impeachment
of tlll' State's own witness, State v. Holley, 34 N.J. 9,
166 At. 2d 758, Certiorari Denied 368 U.S. 884, ·where
such was held to be good trial strategy, but on improper
re~triction on the defendant's cross examination. See
State l'. Cude, Ftah Supreme Court X o. 9619, July 2,
1963, where defense counsel opened the felony question
'";th the defendant and the prosecutor was allowed to
tros~ exrunine there-on. In the case on appeal, the prosecutor not only opened the felony question, but questioned
rE-garding an escape on which no felony was charged
and the method or Ineans of return to the prison (a purported turning himself In In Nevada), and the length
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of incarceration. The Court refused to allow cross l'Xamination regarding the witness' criminal record beyond
the questions of type and number of felonies.
Carl Kuehne was the State's principal witness, without whon1 the State could make no connection between
the defendant and the homicide charge. The Court unduly restricted cross examination with regard to the
background and competency of the witness.
"The right of cross examination in a criminal
case is basic and is zealously guarded by the
Courts . . . cross examination of a witness is a
matter of right ... counsel often cannot :know in
advance what pertinent facts may be elicited. For
that reason, it is necessarily exploratory.... It
is the essence of a fair trial that reasonable latitude he given the cross examiner, even though
he is unable to state to the Court what a reasonable cross examination 1night develop .... " Alford v. the U.S., 282 U.S. 687, 51 Sup. Ct. 218,
75 L. Ed. 624.
In the case on appeal, counsel told the Court by his
proffers of proof precisely what he intended to develop
(R. 737 et seq), and that evidence went to both the competency .and credibility of the State's prime witness, Carl
Kuehne.
The Washington Supreme Court sitting en bane on
June 6, 1963, reversed a first degree homicide conviction
on the ground of a denial of substantive due process of
law, even though the Court allowed a wide latitude and
abundant time for cross exan1nation of the key witness,
where the defendant was obliged to excessive restraint
for fear of being blamed by the jury of goading a preg94
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:~s~ P. :2d Gl-l. In that
tht- Court didn't rt>~trict the cro~~ examination by
~n:-;tai 11 ing- ohjPet ion:-;, but ~howed gT<'at concern for the
witness and callt,d numerous reces~e~ during cross examination due to her ph~·~ical condition.

nant womun. State r. Swellson,
l'llSP

rrhe Court tmduly restricted the defendant's examination of the ~tatP's key witness on questions materjal
to his background, 1nental condition, and cmnpetency.
rrhe judgment should be revers·ed.
POINT XVII
THE DEFENDANT \VAS DEPRIVED OF A FAIR TRIAL
:\ND SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS OF LAW BY THE

GENERAL ATl\IOSPHERE OF THE TRIAL AND BY AN
:\FFII~~IATIVE
SHOWING OF PARTIALITY TO THE
STATE BY THE TRIAL JUDGE THAT MUST NECESSARILY HAVE INFLUENCED THE JURY.

1.,he entire atmosphe-re of the three-week trial was
one of multitudes seeking sensationalism, arising not
from the erhne of murder but fron1 .an expeeted showing of evidence of a deviate homosexual relationship between two women which never did emerge in the for1n
of affinnative evidence. Through fourteen days of evjrlence, the trial Court consistently ruled with the District Attorney whenever a controversy arose as a matter
of law or where there was discretion in the Court, and
often did so smnmarily.
The Court allowed hearsay evidenee for the State
over objection in many instances (Point VI), but denied
the defendant's right to put on evidence material to the
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issue on the- prosecutor's bare staten1ent that the issues
were immaterial to the case (Points X, XI, XII, and

XIV).
Invariably where a point was argued before the
jury, the Court sustained the point of view taken by the
prosecution. Probably the most lucid example of this
is at R. 569-570, where witness Kuehne had claimed
privilege against self-incrimination. The District Attorney informed the Court that it was his opinion that
Carl Kuehne had waived his privilege by testifying at
the preliminary hearing. This is so obviously not the
law that the District Attorney must have been necessarily
aware of his misstatement. Defense couns·el offered to
cite cases thereon, but the Court summarily ruled compelling an answer, and did so again and again on
Kuehne's attempts to claim privilege.
The Court, over defense's objection and on motion
of the prosecutor, took the jury to the scene of the homicide although the State did not contend the conditions
were similar to the night of the killing and had had
numerous pictures of the area without objection by the
defense and though the defense did not dispute any of
the evidence by the State regarding the location or what
happened at the location other than the presence of the
defendant at that place at the time of the shooting.
The Court gav-e all the State's instructions as requested, but refused to give any instructions regarding
the defense's theory of the case. The best example of
the Court's attitude is illustrated by the defendant's re96
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'lu":-;t for a <·Prtificate of probable cau~e following judg-

ment and sentene<·. ~rhe 1notion for certificate wa::;
prp:-;t•ntPd to the Court, together with citations of the
law showing that the certificate is a 1uatter of right unless
there i~ no probable theory for appeal, and the request
i~ factitious or for delay only. The Court asked, "Doe::;
the State oppose the nwtion" ~ Mr. Leary, appearing for
Uw State, said, "Yes, we oppose it" but did not argue
the <tnestion of law. The Court denied the motion (R.
136) and when asked for a statement of grounds said,
"The Court has no grounds for the record at this time."
Off the record but in the presence of Deputy District
.\ttonwy Peter F. Leary and C.S.R. B. ~I. Goodpasture,
when pressed for his grounds for denial of the certificate,
the Court stated: "To be frank with you, Bud, it's a
matter of public policy."
The writer is the first to admit that the above two
paragraphs are not a part of the record, but they graphically illustrate the prejudicial atmosphere of the entire
trial which deprived the defendant of any semblance of
substantive due process of the law and the right to be
tried before an ilnpartial jury and an impartial fonnn.
Fnited States Constitution, Amendments IY, Y, and \1:,
as guaranteed by United States Constitution, Alnendnwn XIV: Also see State L'. Swenson, supra.
SUMMARY
Jean Sinclair was convicted of first degree murder
on the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice.
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Under Points I, 11, Ill, and 1 \', or any e01ubination
thereof, the judgment should be reversed and the defendant discharged as the defense motions for dismissal
and for directed verdict were i1nproperly denied.
On a finding of error on any other point or eumbination of points, the case should be reversed and remanded for new trial with proper and explicit directions
to the trial Court.
The jury, under inadequate instructions regarding
accomplices and aiding and abetting, and ignoring the
def.endant's theory of the case entirely, discounted the
testimony of two doctors as to the defendant's infinnity
and four alibi witnesses in taking the unsupported testimony of an ex-convict who adn1itted accomplicity, and
thereon found a verdict of murder in the first degree.
Theve is no question that the homicide charged was
an ambush slaying or that the District Attorney pleaded
for the death penalty. In spite of the cold blooded, lyingin-wait nature of the killing and the request by the State
for the death penalty and abs-ence of any plea by the
defense for leniency, the jury unanimously recommended
leniency. Can there be any plainer inference that the
jury ignored the evidence or lack of evidence and convicted solely on the oft-inferr-ed but never proved innuendo that there was some kind of homosexual relationship between the defendant and LaRae Peterson~ They
therefore refused to make an obligatory death penalty
because there was no evidence on which they could find
that Jean Sinclair killed Don :B--,oster, but there '"';as an
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infert'll('(' of a not under~ I ood and apparently undesirable and abhorrent ~Pxual relatonship for which the
defendant was not on trial but for which she should be
··g·ottPil off tl11• ;-;tn•(_·t~" and away from society.
The judgment should be reversed and the defendant
di:'1·haq.!;Pd, or in thP alternative, the judgment should
be rPvt>rsed and remanded with adequate directions to
guidP tlw trial Court.
Respectfully submitted,

SUMNER J. HATCH
Attorney for Defendant
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